@jasondavies thank you for your question. I believe that stake-based voting is extremely important, but not dispositive.
It is important because (1) it allows us to take a measure of community preferences weighted by a very important parameter, amount of ZEC holding; and (2) it is an important community-organizing tool, especially in a community where privacy concerns might impeded collective action. As I will argue below, it is an important organizing tool for both the majority and the minority. (For the purposes of this post, I will use “majority” to denote a stake-based majority and “minority” to denote a stake-based minority.)
First, I don’t believe that a stake-based vote should be dispositive, meaning, I don’t believe that either the Company or the Foundation should be obliged to implement the results of a stake-based vote. Let’s consider a worst case scenario: the US federal government secretly buys up a majority of ZEC, and then, in a stake-based vote, votes to hard-fork ZCash by deprecating shielded transactions! This scenario fits your description of a stake-based voting result that does not represent the “true preferences of a community at-large.”
Should the Company or the Foundation support the government’s hard fork just because of the vote? Of course not. Let’s say that the federal government successfully executes their desired hard fork. No problem, the ZEC community can just refuse to use the government’s code and stay on the existing chain that supports shielded transactions. (This illustrates a great feature of blockchains: built-in minority protection against hostile hard forks; the minority can just refuse to use the code behind the hard fork.)
While not dispositive, I do, however, strongly believe that the result of a stake-based vote is very helpful to both the Company and the Foundation with respect to the decisions that each face. Let’s say that we hold a stake-based vote today and find that owners of 75% of all ZEC favor changing the Equihash parameters from (200,9) to (144,5) (as mentioned by @bitcartel). That’s convincing evidence that an economic majority want to change the parameters.
Let’s say that in spite of the vote, the Company chooses to keep Equihash (200,9). In this scenario, if I were a Foundation board member, I would favor the Foundation funding a hard fork to Equihash (144,5) because it gives the community greater choice (by providing a choice that an economic majority prefers) without sacrificing community values like privacy.
Even more importantly, stake-based voting can serve as an essential community organizing tool, especially in the Zcash community, where privacy concerns might inhibit ZEC holders from organizing collectively. Let’s say that both the Company and the Foundation choose to stick with Equihash (200,9). Currently, a supporter of an Equihash (144,5) hard fork really has no way of knowing how many others out there feel the same way. They can look at the forum posts, but those posts might be skewed one way or the other. There might be a disproportionate number of Equihash (144,5) supporters in oppressive countries like China or Venezuala, who are afraid to post publicly on the forum, because their privacy is a matter of personal safety.
If the supporter sees that a 75% majority agrees, it provides the supporter with an impetus and an incentive to move forward and try to execute the hard fork. The vote would also spark other, like-minded users to come forward. A small band of supporters would be motivated to act in part because they know from the stake-based vote that a silent majority is out there ready to support the hard fork.
The same also holds true for the minority. Let’s say the vote goes the other way, and shows that only 25% of the community supports an Equihash (144,5) hard fork. 25% is still a sizable percentage of ZEC, and provides a similar impetus and incentive for a small group of supporters to organize, knowing that a silent sizable minority is out there ready to support the hard fork.
Thus, because of the useful information it can provide and, more importantly, its potential to serve as an essential community organizing tool in a community where privacy concerns might impede collective action, I favor the Foundation supporting the development of stake-based voting.