This is a proposal for the 4 years ahead. In the context of who gets the block subsidies, my proposal doesn’t explicitly care about whatever nuances you think matter between the ZF and the ECC.
You might think there are nuances that matter, but this isn’t your proposal.
This was a good criticism of how the proposal is originally written, I gave the implication of some actionable/ enforceable treasury management by this proposal. I didn’t intend that sort of direct involvement (it is not possible), so I’ll work on updating the language above for clarity. I already acknowledged that you were correct to point out the impracticalities of trying to make anything enforceable.
The revised concept in this proposal is that block subsidy receivers of the past, present, or future, would be held to a gentleman’s agreement where if they want to continue as block subsidy receivers; they would take good-faith actions to reduce exposure to competing altcoin project assets, and would not engage in any new forms of speculative altcoin investing with the ZEC block subsidies.
That is it. A gentleman’s agreement about what is desirable vs. what is not.
ZF has what it has now, correct. It is a non-for-profit entity though(?)
If my proposal gains traction and becomes the community preference, then ZF would find itself needing to change its behavior, while establishing a good-faith path for risking out of the BTC & ETH positions (the same would apply to the ECC with their large BLD & STRK positions).
They could chose not to, it would be a break of trust with the ecosystem, but it would not create anything actionable based on this proposal.
Hypothetically speaking if Qedit and-or Shielded Labs accepted, and became block subsidy receivers, then we would also keep track of how they were applying their block subsidies to Zcash.
If we found that those two new orgs were taking in their ZEC, and then swapping them into BTC/ ETH/ STRK/ BLD, then it would be a break of trust, and would put their status as a receiver in jeopardy also.