If i recall thorchain is adding support for Zcash,that might be a better option going forward than near intents,it’s probably one of the only things ive seen with no complaints about thingsl ike this
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Man this sucks. Hope you get your funds back. Near Intents should’ve blocked you before starting the second swap, that’s the messed up part, and I also was talking so positive about Near. For the rest of us consider that unshielding comes with similar risks as coming out of Tornado cash (tainted). Damn.. Not so much of Zodl’s fault but I found their wallet super dumbed down (no multipe accounts, sub accounts, forced into 24 words) and my opinion is that it is pretty shitty.
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Thanks @type_x_racer, I appreciate your reply. The sequence of events is what makes this experience painful: they took my shielded ZEC, gave me USDT, then held that same USDT when I sent it back eight hours later. Three days later they cleared it in writing and promised a refund, then ghosted me for a month, muted me on Telegram, and put the transaction back on hold after one month of silence. Today, the $589k USDT has been held for 53 days.
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ZEC is withdrawn from a pool to a clean public address. No one knows what happened to the ZEC inside the pool; there is no transaction history for the output. It is equivalent to a “coinbase coin” (a freshly mined coin)—a pristine asset.
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The pristine ZEC is deposited into Intents and exchanged for USDT, with the funds withdrawn to a new, clean address.
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The clean USDT is deposited back into Intents, and a ban is triggered.
The question is: at what stage did the pristine ZEC turn into “dirty” USDT—and was there ever really a problem to begin with?There are only two possibilities in this scenario:
1 – Intens issued “dirty” USDT during the initial swap.
2 – They simply stole the user’s USDT under a made-up pretext.
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Fair point. I have seen countless times how KYC/AML is just a pretext to “legally” confiscate funds. But yeah, sure, centralized stablecoins are “better fiat” 
Since the whole chain of events seems to have stopped when it touched Tether (USDT) have you trying contacting them?
Near may not be the issue, Tether can also freeze funds.
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based on his full statement he did attempt to contact them multiple times
It seems like he was in contact with Near multiple times, don’t see anything about trying to contact Tether directly about the USDT part of the transfer.
@Shawn Tether has nothing to do with the hold based on the record so far. The USDT moved successfully on-chain from my Ledger into the NEAR Intents deposit address. After that, NEAR support opened the compliance review, cleared it, confirmed the 23 July release, collected my refund address, raised the refund request, and later reopened the review. That is the NEAR compliance file.
The Tether blacklist is also directly checkable on-chain through the USDT contract. Anyone can query isBlackListed / getBlackListStatus for the NEAR Intents deposit address 0x47c3646e7fe6d619293602E9cD8bD1CF4127fDBe and my Ledger address 0x22E62aeD6696a1f089e98e63A35b63d6fDC2f287. Both addresses are not on Tether’s blacklist.
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What about the origins of the Zcash, every zcash starts on transparent before going into shielded, couldn’t you show your proof of innocence path by showing you own the addresses that send those to shielded? What exchange did it originate and could you get someone from that exchange to confirm it for NI? The path to recovery for half a million dollars seem lax . .
I was already cleared.
Without being asked, I sent screenshots, addresses, hashes, the full on-chain flow, swap history, proof the shielded ZEC came from my Zodl wallet, an explanation showing every account and wallet involved belonged to me, and I offered to prove ownership of any address by signing a verification message.
NEAR’s compliance team reviewed the deposit and cleared it in writing.
So this is no longer about what more I could provide. It is about how many times a static transaction history is supposed to be reviewed before a compliance decision means anything. Especially when that review came from a rail integrated to serve privacy users, inside the same wallet that encouraged me to hold those funds shielded in the first place. The product tells you to shield because privacy is the feature, then the moment you need to exit, that same privacy becomes a liability and a problem you are expected to solve?
If a completed review can be reopened without a new fact, a new risk signal, or even a stated reason, then “cleared” does not mean cleared. It means cleared until someone changes their mind.
What you’re describing is unshielding on request: trace the ZEC back through the pool, identify the transparent origin, name the exchange, then find a third party to vouch for me.
If that is the price of exiting shielded ZEC at size, then shielding did not protect my financial history. It only delayed the moment I would be forced to hand it over or lose access to my funds. Making access to already cleared funds conditional on surrendering that privacy is a dangerous standard. I would be careful calling the recovery effort “lax.”
Because then the question becomes bigger than whether the Zcash shielded pool gives you privacy. It is whether you own that privacy, or merely rent it until the first review, or until someone changes their mind.
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Hello, brother! Everything at NEAR is controlled solely by Illia, including all major decisions and payments. He is obsessively determined to control everything, so if you want to get this resolved, you need to contact him directly.
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@timtech the only difference between your first and second deposit that is still missing is the withdrawal address. I think intents deposit address 0x47c3646e7fe6d619293602E9cD8bD1CF4127fDBe encodes both the target token and recipient. What was it? Could it be that your target address is somehow under some sanctions?
It does not justify holding your money, nothing does. I am simply looking for any possible rational explanation - so far there is none, not even a highly hypothetical one.
@privacyaboveall The second deposit was never credited. The USDT transfer from my Ledger 0x22E62aeD6696a1f089e98e63A35b63d6fDC2f287 to the NEAR Intents deposit address 0x47c3646e7fe6d619293602E9cD8bD1CF4127fDBe confirmed on-chain. That transfer is 0x1366d07f63a18719a674840d02a84d5b830d8c26186afb28bb050401d3038f8d (20 Jul 2026, 589,164.866424 USDT). NEAR Intents never credited that deposit, so no swap ran, there was no output transaction, and no recipient address received anything. The USDT is still sitting on the deposit address they issued.
If you mean the intended recipient from the quote bound to that deposit address, that field existed before I sent the USDT. A 1Click deposit address is issued only after a quote is created, and the quote already contains the recipient. So that recipient was in NEAR’s record before the transfer, and it was available during the compliance review that ended with them writing that the review had been successfully concluded, that the funds would be released, and that all restrictions had been removed. It is not a new fact that appeared after 23 July.
The transparent on-chain path after the first successful swaps used newly created ETH addresses: the MetaMask 0x85e5e691B99AEa7b0D42a493C12f78bc077E38f4, the Ledger above, and the per-quote deposit address NEAR Intents issued.
Before 20 July those two wallets had no on-chain history. The path was simply NEAR Intents settlement of the first swaps, the transfer between my two new wallets, and then the transfer into the NEAR Intents deposit address. There was no older history on those addresses that could have been discovered later. A sanctions listing based on the prior history of those two wallets cannot explain the hold, because there was no prior history at all.
Even if the intended recipient in that quote caused the first flag, it does not explain reopening the same static file a month later with no new transaction, no new deposit, no new event, and no stated reason.
There is no publicly verifiable reason for the blocking of funds (onchain data is clean); no technical impediment to the transfer was detected at the USDT level. The available data does not support the conclusion that the blocking is justified.
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Near Intents transfers ZEC in and out all day (huge amts I’m sure) and even in his case the first swap was sent through. Zodl had very little to do with this. It’s the ledger to back to intents 8 hours later. The most plausible reason why they would block this second swap is, he forgot to turn on his VPN and he’s from N.K, or from a scam center in cambodia.
“What you’re describing is unshielding on request: trace the ZEC back through the pool, identify the transparent origin, name the exchange, then find a third party to vouch for me.If that is the price of exiting shielded ZEC at size, then shielding did not protect my financial history”
Dood, IF I need to recover half a million dollars you I would trace it all the way back to the exchange, and a add sing and dance. But you seem to more concerned discrediting N.I. I can see why but doesn’t sound like a person who really lost 1/2 M.
It’s possible to create viewing keys in Zcash, that should be your next offering to them.
Just use Zingo, option , wallet seed and you’ll see Viewing Key
I was not using any VPN, and I’m not from any restricted country. NEAR can verify that from their side.
I’m not here to prove your theories right or wrong. The purpose of this thread was to document and share my experience exiting shielded ZEC from Zodl through NEAR Intents. If that makes you nervous, I’m sorry.
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Once again, Intents messed up badly on many levels. They should have refused the deposit right away or at least return the money immediately. Intents is obviously a custodial service as well since they can freeze your money, I will be very careful if I ever use them again.
Now, @timtech, the way you are dancing around the question and writing 5 paragraphs to explain how the recipient does not matter makes me pretty sure you know very well this is the reason and you know why this recipient got you blocked. If you want to share the story for everyone to judge independently you should not omit the critical piece of information. What was the recipient address?
The second deposit was never credited.
Based on the docs the deposit address is tied to the token and recipient. It can’t be credited independent of the swap, it can only be credited for the purpose of the swap in favor of a particular recipient. You were basically trying to send tokens to a particular address, it got stopped. Let’s try to figure out why.
The rest of your message is “but they cleared it, why did they change their mind” over and over. There are plenty of reasons, a court order, subpoena, recipient address sanctioned, etc - all of this could have changed. When sending tokens to a custodial service you should expect as much.
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The intended recipient address was 0xbF7C2E376508F2FC29F6f64fBDA5c0Fa24E9eEc8, a newly created account with no prior history. The address 0x47c3646e7fe6d619293602E9cD8bD1CF4127fDBe was generated by NEAR Intents as the deposit address for that transaction.
I’m attaching the original support message as well, where I reported exactly that account and exactly that deposit address at the time.
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