Hi Tom,
Thanks for the support and feedback!
We just introduced .zcash names (zcashnames.com) which resolves on-chain, so wallets can verify name-to-address mappings directly without relying on our Zcash.me website.
Regarding quantum attack surface, we will adapt as the space evolves.
Thanks, again, we will keep iterating and focusing on real usage and onboarding.
All the best!
The vote I called for (not the Key-Holder Orgs) was to rescind the grant, it was not a vote to re-approve it or override the veto.
The vote question was irrespective of the veto. If coin holders voted to rescind, it would be in force in case the veto is not upheld. Otherwise, the veto takes precedent as you pointed out.
Given the review period was not upheld, I suppose this will act as an informal poll and a new vote can be held if the veto is not upheld.
I stand by both parts of my objection. It was clearly wrong to include the question without any meaningful review period. I understand what your intent was (and understood what it probably was when I made my objections). However, that was not how the question came out. With an adequate review period, the ambiguity of meaning could perhaps have been resolved.
What you said (in part):
Separately, there is an ongoing dispute about vetoing this grant [1, 2]. Regardless of the veto process, coin holders may want to vote to cancel this grant as well.
The actual question:
âDo you approve rescinding the Q4 2025 grant of $2,673,974 to Electric Coin Company (Bootstrap Org), given the organizational changes that have occurred since the original vote?â
See the problem? If the simple majority outcome of the vote is Oppose, Bootstrap can say that coinholders âdo not approve rescinding the Q4 2025 grantâ.
Rescinding the grant was going to happen anyway; the disbursement is under the control of the same organisations that vetoed it (Shielded Labs and ZF). They just donât sign the 2-of-3 multisig, and Bootstrapâs signature isnât sufficient on its own.
Holding a vote can only potentially produce a political obstacle to that otherwise technically assured outcome. That is not just because the question is poorly worded (which it is), but because in principle the veto mechanism is supposed to cover cases where, in the judgement of the required threshold (one or two depending on the reason) of Key-Holder Organisations, the grant should be vetoed regardless of the outcome of any coin-weighted vote. That is particularly important because the Key-Holder Organisations are properly the authorities on interpreting their own legal and ethical obligations.
It was quite deliberate that for this case, the technical mechanism of a 2-of-3 multisig is exactly aligned with what the governance process says should happen. That isnât always possible â for example, in the case where the Veto process allows a veto by a single org, the other two technically could override it, but shouldnât. However, the design deliberately prioritizes using a multisig that matches the governance process for the case of a 2-org veto (i.e. where at least two of the orgs have âa principled objection to it on the basis of potential harm to Zcash users, or because it is antithetical to the values of the Zcash communityâ). Why? Well, aside from that being necessary to achieve other goals in the case of key loss, it was because I correctly foresaw that such a case might be caused by one of the Key-Holder Organisations, which would then presumably be uncooperative.
(I actually wanted there to be five Key-Holder Organisations, but there werenât five orgs prepared to take on that responsibility.)
But the question doesnât say that! Given that it doesnât say that, there was the possibility that Bootstrap could spin the outcome to imply whatever is in their own interest.
The âany contentious issueâ test is intentionally much weaker than the âprincipled objection to it on the basis of potential harm to Zcash users, or because it is antithetical to the values of the Zcash communityâ test, which is why a coin-weighted vote would be appropriate if only that weaker condition applied. I couldnât possibly have predicted the circumstances of the whole ECC staff walking out and forming a new company. But I could and did predict that there might be cases in which a veto was needed after a grant had been voted for â and this situation certainly qualifies.
What could cause the veto not to be upheld? The grant isnât going to be paid, because Shielded Labs and ZF arenât going to sign the disbursement multisig. If, for the sake of argument, there were some legal challenge by Bootstrap, then the grant still wouldnât be paid until that challenge is resolved. In that case there would be plenty of time to hold a vote with a carefully worded question. There was no need to rush a question into the poll contrary to the 30-day review period required by ZIP 1016; that could only hurt, not help.