# Simple idea for incentivizing zaddr use

**URL:** <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778>\
**Category:** Technology\
**Created:** [January 15, 2020, 11:39pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778 "2020-01-15T23:39:05Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 7\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![murbard](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/murbard/32/15464_2.png) [@murbard](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/murbard)\
**Post date:** [January 15, 2020, 11:39pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/1 "2020-01-15T23:39:05Z")

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Hi folks, just sharing a simple idea for incentivizing zaddr use.

Keep two counters in the state of the chain, n\_s and n\_t (n “shielded” and n “total”). n\_s tracks the number of shielded coins, n\_t tracks the number of zec that went in minus the number of zec that went out. In the current implementation, those number are supposed to be the same, but that doesn’t have to be the case.

1. When coins are being shielded, increase n\_s, when they are being unshielded, decrease n\_s. This is easy, it lets you track the total number of shielded coins.

2. Now, at every block symbolically assign some amount b to the pool of shielded coin. b can be inflationary, it can be taken from the block reward, it can come from gifts, it just has to come from somewhere.

3. Each time b zec are “assigned” to the shielded pool, increase n\_t by b but do not increase n\_s. Each time coins are being shielded, also increase n\_t.

4. When c coins are unshielded to a taddr, credit it ot with c zec but with c \times n\_t / n\_s zec. Decrease n\_s by c and decrease n\_t by c \times n\_t / n\_s.

This is rather easy to do and incentivize keeping coins shielded over time. The downside is that one shielded zec is now worth more than a non shielded zec, and the ratio between the two (n\_t / n\_s) changes over time.

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**Author:** ![anon16456014](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f0a364/32.png) [@anon16456014](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/anon16456014)\
**Post date:** [January 15, 2020, 11:56pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/2 "2020-01-15T23:56:56Z")

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There is a simpler idea: Kill transparent addresses altogether.

Problem solved 🙂

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**Author:** ![Autotunafish](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/autotunafish/32/7827_2.png) [@Autotunafish](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/Autotunafish)\
**Post date:** [January 16, 2020, 12:18am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/3 "2020-01-16T00:18:53Z")

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Happy cake day 🦓 🌺

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**Author:** ![zancas](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/zancas/32/42011_2.png) [@zancas](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/zancas)\
**Post date:** [January 16, 2020, 12:41am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/4 "2020-01-16T00:41:56Z")

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Congratulations on hitting your 1 year mark!

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**Author:** ![str4d](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/str4d/32/64_2.png) [@str4d](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/str4d)\
**Post date:** [January 16, 2020, 3:11am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/5 "2020-01-16T03:11:11Z")

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A related idea was posted a while back on Reddit:

> **[r/zec - privacy proposal for ZEC incentives](https://www.reddit.com/r/zec/comments/c70fzz/privacy_proposal_for_zec_incentives/)**
>
> 13 votes and 10 comments so far on Reddit

This thread looks (at a glance) like a generalisation of the incentivisation part of that proposal.

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**Author:** ![dontbeevil](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/4491bb/32.png) [@dontbeevil](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/dontbeevil)\
**Post date:** [January 16, 2020, 6:04am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/6 "2020-01-16T06:04:51Z")

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Is there a zip for the idea described on reddit? I see a comment from @nathan-at-least that ZIP was in-works. Is there a better strategy to go fully shielded?

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**Author:** ![mitchellpkt](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/mitchellpkt/32/21357_2.png) [@mitchellpkt](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/mitchellpkt)\
**Post date:** [January 22, 2020, 12:34am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/simple-idea-for-incentivizing-zaddr-use/35778/7 "2020-01-22T00:34:49Z")

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While we’re in the paradigm of suggesting fixed fees (I believe current recommendation is 0.0001 ZEC fee for any transaction with shielded components), perhaps we could implement some variation of a discount. For example, consensus enforces 0.0001 ZEC fee for transactions sending to/within sapling shielded pool, and 0.0002 ZEC for other transactions.

A few small notes on boundary conditions:

To incentivize **users** to prioritize the sapling shielded pool, they should pay more for a non-sapling transaction.

To avoid perverse incentives for **miners** they should receive more fees for sapling transactions. Otherwise, transparent transactions would be smaller _and_ better paying!

How can we reconcile these two? Some of the fee could be burned (or donated to dev fund or whatever). So we might have something like this:

Transaction to/within sapling: user pays 0.0001 ZEC, miner takes home 0.0001 ZEC  
Transaction without sapling: user pays 0.0002 ZEC, miner takes home 0.00009 ZEC

Just floating this idea, nothing to take too seriously.

(Quick note: If we ever implement a dynamic fee mechanism to keep things running smoothly with high transaction volume, then **fee per unit size** to meet the constraints listed above.)

// edit: typos //
