# Suggestion per Sandblast Retro **URL:** \ **Category:** General\ **Created:** [November 21, 2023, 4:13am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/suggestion-per-sandblast-retro/46086 "2023-11-21T04:13:28Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![mdr0id](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/mdr0id/32/37160_2.png) [@mdr0id](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/mdr0id)\ **Post date:** [November 21, 2023, 4:13am UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/suggestion-per-sandblast-retro/46086/1 "2023-11-21T04:13:28Z")
> [@Sandblasting & NU5 Retrospectives](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/sandblasting-nu5-retrospectives/46058): > > During the next few 21:00 UTC slot Arborist calls (starting on 30th November), we will conduct a retrospective of the Sandblasting attack and NU5. The list of topics we want to cover includes: Sandblast attack post-mortem - 30th November Specifics of the attack (phase 1: sapling/orchard, and phase 2: dust) Our response to long-running attacks Who is responsible for responding to attacks? Who is responsible for monitoring the network? How to avoid similar issues in the future Links to tec… The R&D thread is locked per a pre approved list, but since it is open to the community just wanted to ask some minor questions. 1. Given the historical issues with exchanges/miners with large wallets, was there any attempt to create a similar sandblast wallet to help reduce these friction points moving forward? (e.g. create a fake wallet for load testing and test moving forward) 2. It seems like it was very well known that this was part of the fee mechanism and lasted for a while, so it also seems that this attack could have been used to not only benefit large wallet loads for an exchange, but also SDK wallets? Essentially, I’m asking outside of the reactive phase(zip317) what proactive steps were taken besides just bounding actions in a wallet? Also what tests are now implemented and monitored to ensure attacks similar don’t happen again?