# Zebra 7.1.0: Security Fixes for Sync and Memory Exhaustion

**URL:** <https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/59367>\
**Category:** Zcash Foundation\
**Created:** [November 16, 2026, 9:48pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/59367 "2026-11-16T21:48:01Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 2\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![ZcashFoundation](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/zcashfoundation/32/21548_2.png) [@ZcashFoundation](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/ZcashFoundation)\
**Post date:** [November 16, 2026, 9:48pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/59367/1 "2026-11-16T21:48:01Z")

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We are pleased to announce the release of **Zebra 7.1.0**. It fixes ten security advisories, most of which closed ways another node on the network (a _peer_) could stop a Zebra node from catching up with the chain, or make it run out of memory. It also adds sync and memory diagnostics, automatic peer recovery, and clearer errors. Upgrading from 7.0.0 needs no resync.

## **Who Needs to Act**

- **Node operators, including miners and mining pools:** upgrade now. Before you do, see [Upgrading](https://zfnd.org/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/#upgrading).
- **Wallet, exchange, and** `lightwalletd` **operators:** upgrade now. One advisory let concurrent address balance requests run a node out of memory.
- **Developers using Zebra’s Rust crates:** this release has breaking API changes. See [Library Users](https://zfnd.org/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/#library-users).
- **ZEC holders and wallet users:** there is nothing to do.

## **Security Advisories**

Several of these issues affect only _initial sync_, when a new node downloads and checks the chain to catch up with the network. The others affect nodes that are already in sync, so every node should upgrade.

### **[GHSA-j8gf-c4rj-6jv5](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-j8gf-c4rj-6jv5): Blocks Dense With Transparent Outputs Exhaust Node Memory**

Zebra keeps its most recent blocks in memory, so it can switch to a competing branch of the chain if one overtakes it. Each branch kept its own copy of that data, so a run of blocks filled with transparent (unshielded) outputs could run a node out of memory again on every restart. Branches now share the data, and Zebra now limits how much of it can build up (see Upgrading). Thanks to **Foundry Digital** for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-m44m-9r8r-r64j](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-m44m-9r8r-r64j): Forged Blocks Could Halt Sync at the Checkpoint Handoff**

A peer could send forged blocks at the point where initial sync switches from checkpoints (known block hashes that ship with Zebra) to full validation, which halted initial sync. Zebra now rejects those blocks and bans the peer. Thanks to [@unusualbyte](https://github.com/unusualbyte) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-g9rc-89v4-hhvf](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-g9rc-89v4-hhvf): Rewritten Coinbase Height Stops Initial Sync**

### **[GHSA-hvw5-x88g-2q8w](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-hvw5-x88g-2q8w): Checkpoint Queue Indexed by a Rewritable Height**

A peer could serve a block with a rewritten height (its position in the chain) that Zebra didn’t reject, which could stop initial sync. Zebra now checks that a block’s contents match its header before trusting the height, bans the peer, and asks another peer for the block. Thanks to [@x15-eth](https://github.com/x15-eth) and [@SphereDonout](https://github.com/SphereDonout) for reporting these issues.

### **[GHSA-hj54-2mfv-4xg8](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-hj54-2mfv-4xg8): Address Balance Requests Could Run the Node Out of Memory**

Each transparent address balance request, through the `getaddressbalance` RPC or `lightwalletd`, copied all of the node’s recent blocks. Many requests at once, for example through a public wallet service, could run the node out of memory. Balance requests now read only the data they need, and `getaddressutxos` and `getaddresstxids` requests no longer copy every recent UTXO and transaction of the requested addresses. Thanks to [@saxenism](https://github.com/saxenism) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-vw2c-5w35-x5q6](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-vw2c-5w35-x5q6): Known Block Hashes Restarted Sync Rounds**

A peer could make Zebra abandon its current round of block downloads and start over, again and again, by including blocks Zebra already had in its reply, which could stop sync. Zebra now skips those blocks and keeps the rest. Thanks to [@AnticsDecoded](https://github.com/AnticsDecoded) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-8qxv-5f2c-452c](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8qxv-5f2c-452c): Unbounded Queues of Unverifiable Blocks**

Blocks waiting for checkpoint verification, or for their parent block, were kept without a memory limit, even after Zebra stopped waiting for them. Both queues now have limits, and sync requests a block it still needs again if it was dropped. Thanks to [@Maakai123](https://github.com/Maakai123), [@DanielDerefaka](https://github.com/DanielDerefaka), and [@SphereDonout](https://github.com/SphereDonout) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-7jvw-68q7-xfh4](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-7jvw-68q7-xfh4): Forged Queued Block Got an Honest Peer Banned**

A peer that sent a forged copy of a block first could get the honest peer that sent the real block banned, without being penalized itself. Zebra now holds each peer responsible for the block it sent. Thanks to [@x15-eth](https://github.com/x15-eth) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-423j-2vj4-j5x4](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-423j-2vj4-j5x4): Script Verification of Nonstandard Transactions**

The _mempool_, where unconfirmed transactions wait to be mined, verified every signature in a transaction before checking that it was within the standard limit of 4,000 signature operations. A peer could keep the node busy with transactions it would reject anyway. The mempool now checks the limit first. Block validation is unchanged. Thanks to [@janneh2000](https://github.com/janneh2000) for reporting this issue.

### **[GHSA-2wx4-g5cf-32pf](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-2wx4-g5cf-32pf): Rejected Transactions Still Added Proof Verification Work**

The mempool started verifying a transaction’s zero knowledge proofs before the cheaper checks against the chain, so transactions it went on to reject still slowed down the proof verification that block validation also uses. The mempool now runs the cheaper checks first. Thanks to [@Nathanbyarugaba](https://github.com/Nathanbyarugaba) and [@SphereDonout](https://github.com/SphereDonout) for reporting these issues.

## **Other Security Improvements**

- Sync is harder to stall: one peer can no longer fill a node’s download queue, an invalid block no longer cancels unrelated downloads, and stalled verification waits time out.
- The mempool rejects transactions with nonstandard outputs, such as dust or oversized `OP_RETURN` data, before verifying their scripts and proofs.
- The health endpoint and block requests from peers have tighter limits on the connections and memory they can use.
- Misbehaving peers’ scores are no longer lost under load ([#11796](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11796)).

## **Breaking Changes**

### **Node Operators**

The experimental `elasticsearch` feature is removed. If you built `zebrad` with it, remove `elasticsearch_url`, `elasticsearch_username`, and `elasticsearch_password` from the `[state]` section of your config, or it won’t load ([#12176](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/12176)). Official builds never had this feature.

### **Library Users**

Every library crate except `tower-batch-control` and `tower-fallback` gets a new major version. Recent blocks now share their indexes between chain branches, which changes `zebra-chain` value balance methods and removes several `zebra-state` `Chain` APIs. New error variants need handling in exhaustive matches. Upgrade `zebra-chain` together with the crates that depend on it. Each crate’s `CHANGELOG.md` lists its new version and the full API changes.

## **New Features and Fixes**

- **Sync stall diagnosis:** when sync restarts, Zebra logs why, and new `sync.restart.count`, `sync.block.error.count`, and `sync.downloads.oldest_age_seconds` metrics show where it is stuck ([#11900](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11900)).
- **New sync signals:** `sync.block.error.count` counts blocks dropped from a full verification queue under the `queue_full` kind, and `sync.restart.count` counts sync rounds where the chain tip doesn’t advance for 8 minutes under the `sync_step_timeout` reason ([#12472](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/12472)).
- **Memory metrics:** new metrics report the process’s memory use and the size of its recent block data, including `state.memory.index.entries`.
- **Peer recovery:** a node left with no outbound peers and no peer addresses to try now retries its DNS seeders and its configured and saved peers, at most every 5 minutes, instead of waiting for a restart, and starts from its saved peers if DNS fails at startup ([#11807](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11807)).
- **Clearer errors:** RPC requests without valid credentials get an HTTP 401 response ([#11797](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11797)), and a database that can’t be opened shows the real cause ([#11933](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11933)).
- **Sentry:** error reports now carry stack traces, so existing issues may reappear as new ones ([#11855](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/pull/11855)).

The [release notes](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v7.1.0) and the crate changelogs list every change.

## **Upgrading**

Get the release from [GitHub](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v7.1.0), [crates.io](https://crates.io/crates/zebrad), or [Docker Hub](https://hub.docker.com/r/zfnd/zebra?tag=7.1.0) as `zfnd/zebra:7.1.0`. Upgrading from 7.0.0 needs no migration or resync. If you are upgrading from 6.x, read the [7.0.0 release notes](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v7.0.0) first.

This release is supported until around December 10, 2026. After that, `zebrad` stops itself, and it starts warning about a week before, so plan to move to the next release by then.

If you use the health endpoint, it now serves one request per connection, closes connections that don’t send their request headers within 5 seconds, and keeps at most 32 connections open.

**Memory and chain reorganizations.** Zebra keeps up to 1,000 recent blocks in memory, so it can follow a chain reorganization (a switch to a competing branch) that deep. This release limits their indexes to 6,200,000 entries on Mainnet and 2,000,000 on test networks. Ordinary Mainnet blocks don’t reach the limit. If unusually dense blocks do, Zebra keeps at least 100 recent blocks, and until the dense blocks are finalized (permanently written to disk) it can’t follow a reorganization deeper than the blocks it kept. `zcashd` doesn’t reorganize more than 99 blocks. At the limit, recent blocks use about 5 to 6 GB, and during initial sync, blocks waiting for checkpoint verification can use about 4 GB more, so we recommend 16 GB of RAM, as in Zebra’s [system requirements](https://zebra.zfnd.org/user/requirements.html).

## **Thank You to Our Contributors**

This release was made possible by the work of [@alchemydc](https://github.com/alchemydc), [@andres-pcg](https://github.com/andres-pcg), [@Anirudh-712](https://github.com/Anirudh-712), [@arcayne](https://github.com/arcayne), [@arya2](https://github.com/arya2), [@conradoplg](https://github.com/conradoplg), [@gustavovalverde](https://github.com/gustavovalverde), [@jvff](https://github.com/jvff), [@kriss39](https://github.com/kriss39), [@oxarbitrage](https://github.com/oxarbitrage), [@Ravan002](https://github.com/Ravan002), [@robustfengbin](https://github.com/robustfengbin), [@upbqdn](https://github.com/upbqdn), and [@zacheryasc](https://github.com/zacheryasc). Thank you for your continued contributions to Zebra.

_Zebra is the Zcash Foundation’s independent, Rust-based implementation of the Zcash protocol. Learn more at [github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra](https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra)._

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Phantom](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/zcash/user_avatar/forum.zcashcommunity.com/phantom/32/50724_2.png) [@Phantom](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/u/Phantom)\
**Post date:** [November 17, 2026, 7:15pm UTC](https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/zebra-7-1-0-security-fixes-for-sync-and-memory-exhaustion/59367/2 "2026-11-17T19:15:50Z")

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Zebra keeps up to 1,000 recent blocks in memory, about 7 hours of chain at NU7’s 25s blocks. The 20s proposal scales node defaults like `MAX_REORG_LENGTH` by 5/4. Does the 1,000-block window follow that setting? If it grows to 1,250 blocks, do the 6,200,000-entry index limit and the 16 GB RAM guidance move with it?

Also, what value of `state.memory.index.entries` should operators alert on before the limit? If dense blocks push a node down to its 100-block floor, a warning ahead of that point gives time to react.
