@tromer sorry for coming in a bit late on this.
I’m in favor of the Volatility Reserve and an endowment mechanism Most of all, I’m in favor of testing out this mechanism for the next 4 years. I think it’s fiscally responsible, it’s innovative and pushing the boundaries of decentralized governance, and ultimately can be reversed.
That being said, I’ve also been an advocate of incentive alignment from upside. Subsequently, allocating a %-of/ half of excess funding back to each respective entity seems to resolve some of the concerns raised on this thread. Although, I would prefer a blended approach (surprise, surprise) whereby allocation is based on both:
- **a % of funds over 700K cap (as @tromer proposed) AND
- a % of interest created from endowment/ revenue-share activities creating incentive alignment opportunity for fund managers**
However, my main concern is scale (and therefore usefulness) of the Reserve. As proposed, we have a 3-way split + (potentially) a further split… Just keep in mind, if the fund is too small it won’t be very useful. I would strongly recommend reaching out to a fund manager and running some numbers before making a decision on this, I am certainly not an expert.
@tromer or @zooko have you run any models on this?
A simple fix is to only permit endowment/ revenue-share activities once a threshold of reserve funds has been achieved.
The conversation has mostly focused on concerns, so I’d like to remind the community of the potential opportunity held within equity/ revenue-share capabilities:
A Volatility Reserve coupled with an endowment mechanism (i.e. ability to invest or create a revenue-share agreement with other market-creating companies) might end up being a HUGE strategic advantage for Z-cash. Not only is ZCash creating the most innovative tech, but it would also be able to fund and build a supporting ecosystem.
That being said, investments have risks and legal complications. @zooko, @tromer has your legal team reviewed the structural requirements for endowment/revenue-share activities?
- Unfortunately, my experience is within the Canadian context, but in Canada, non-profits’ taking equity is a big No however revenue-share agreements are OK.
- Would all entities holding a Reserve be responsible for hiring and maintaining fund managers to steward the fund? Will all entities agree on investment criteria?
- Do we consider a simpler alternative, place ZEC in an interest-bearing account and call it a day, (loosing the whole market-creating up-side). Keep in mind that revenue-share agreements theoretically should be less risky.
Maybe it’s too complicated but I would hate to give up on something innovative just because it’s ‘not possible.’ That wouldn’t be a very thing to do.
Playing catch-up on some of the other points in the proposal:
On the MG determined by a committee v.s. ZF my suggestions is a divide in decision-making power, say there are 6 seats, 3 for ZF 3 for Community Advisory - no veto rights for ZF. Ideally, these are fixed seats, but we can explore the idea of adding non-voting rotating seats based on expertise. i.e. bring in ECC, ZF, or other external experts in an advisory capacity- on a rotating basis- but do not grant them voting rights.
Also, the proposal says, “ZF shall strive to define target metrics and KPI, and utilize these in its funding decisions.” I think this is a disservice to ZF and the entire Zcash community. My strong suggestion is to remove ‘strive’ and commit to defining metrics.
As for the voting mechanism, @tromer I really appreciate you bringing in an incentive for development, but I worry that it’s dictating a priority that may not actually be a priority. I’m okay to remove any wording around that.