Thanks for the thoughtful feedback!
I hadn’t considered the possibility of some parties being completely blocked from participation.
I hope, and indeed expect, that all Councilors would be “motivated primarily by principles and ideology”. I view the CBF, as a complement to those mechanisms.
I completely agree with this sentiment @tromer and have tried to express this in multiple ways but this really just hit the nail on the head.
I would hope this, but I would not build a system of governance around this. There should always be meaningful incentive-alignment keeping principles, ideology, and reality in check- and aligned.
It sounds like we’re in agreement!
Indeed.
I draw your attention to the proposal you linked
No need for a supplemental proposal – payment is already included in @avichal 's proposal.
Back to your original point though, this is a frustrating component of how the ZF and other non-profits work in the US – board members aren’t supposed to be paid 
Thanks! Was that there all along?!
As far as I know! I only noticed because I ran into a similar concern with my proposal, but couldn’t find a workaround without a third entity.
FWIW, I view this as a feature not a bug. In fact in many nonprofits board members are expected to either a) donate or b) if they can’t donate, contribute to large-scale fundraising efforts, which is another way of having “skin in the game” for a mission-driven organization.
That sounds nice but the reality is something different. Often nonprofit board members reap other benefits through the affiliation: connections, social status, political influence, etc. They get paid.
I know you do, and I love that!.. but as a crypto system designer I want to replace good intentions with bonding, vesting, and other weird incentive mechanisms 
This would be great for the ZF down the road, though it does rankle of “must have previous wealth to participate”.
I’ve seen this as well, but both of these visions are extreme. I hope the middle ground is most common.
That said, if being on the ZF board becomes that sort of influential non-profit board seat, I think we’ll have done something right 
EDIT: Too many emojis, sheesh.
I don’t think this is contradictory to a board member donating or contributing to large-scale fundraising efforts? And if they’re paid in status/affiliation (particularly since they won’t be actively involved in day-to-day operation of a nonprofit) then the point stands that they shouldn’t be given financial compensation.
Yup I agree, which is why it’s not a requirement (informal or otherwise) for anyone on the board today. But donating their time to fundraising is a reasonable expectation IMHO.
Well… I’m embarrassed I thought I read the original proposal closely with an eye towards the funding question.
A way which is only available to the elite.
This is a pay-to-play scheme.
You can only be a board member if you are independently wealthy, or time-rich?
AFAIK no one on the current Zcash Foundation board is independently wealthy. And if you are not “time-rich” then you absolutely should not be lending your non-existent time to guide an organization.
I find this statement a little strange given that your previous proposed solution to community governance issues is to literally let people pay for votes to unilaterally decide (not one signal among many) who sits on this and other governing bodies.
In my humble opinion, being a “Member of a Strategic Governing Council” should not be a “side-gig”.
Is it the case that the issues facing the community are simple? Well-understood? Unimportant?
Why would the ultimate allocating authority have their role described as anything other than full-time?
It should be a Councilor’s occupation, and preoccupation.
Preferably it should be a passion.
Good point! I’ll have to think about this. Am I being inconsistent? That’s a real possibility.
I’ll “type outloud” while I’m trying to understand two topics:
(CAVEAT: I notice references to the ZF Board. I haven’t really thought about that Board, and I’m not sure anything I am saying here is relevant to it. I mean maybe it is, I have made some pretty general assertions, but… I wasn’t thinking about it when I inflamed… err… instigated… err… initiated this thread.)
On the one hand I’m talking about how that amorphous thing,
“The Zcash community” should be allowed to vote.
On the Voting Issue:
I don’t know that weighting in proportion to Zcash stake is the best mechanism. I am curious to hear about alternative schemes.
If there is a proposal that the significance, the weight, of a vote should not be proportional to the amount of Zcash held,
then I’d like to know what the proposed alternative mechanism is.
What should that weight be proportional to?
How should its significance be measured?
I think @gojomo has asserted that Stake-Weighting ought to be a factor. I’m going to advocate for the “pure” Stake-Weighting option.
I believe the following are two properties of Stake-Weighting (thanks to @gojomo for introducing me to the term):
Per The Issue of Paying Councilors:
I think there are two important reasons to pay Councilors:
I think that the second point, that decisions should be aligned with the value of ZEC is the same both in the case of voting, and in the case of paying Councilors in ZEC. Soo… in my own opinion, I am consistent in these two positions. Which seems suspicious… but, there it is.
Oh… also, I think being “time-rich” is being “independently wealthy”. I subscribe to the Nassim Taleb defintion of wealth:
“Wealth is the ability to not think about money.”
An agent’s ability to stake is proportional to the agent’s interest in “number go up” with respect to ZEC, and even that is bounded to how long they are personally holding ZEC. It’s a liquid asset, after all — buy, vote, sell, why not? Great attack vector, tbh, and we know there are sufficiently rich people who have interests, economic and otherwise, counter to ZEC flourishing.
I think I was insufficiently specific.
I believe that inasmuch as an agent holds ZEC, it’s incentivized to maximize the value of the ZEC it holds.
I’m not making assertions about other incentives the agent will (in the case that the agent is human) certainly have.
Does this sound correct to you? Or am I missing something?
Coming from staking protocol design, the missing piece here is “what else do they hold”. This argument only works if the asset and stake are huge, and the agent can’t open a profitable short outside the system they’re governing.