@joshs - I support this proposal. Zcash has significant governance needs without great forms of legitimate governance baked in. There is still so much work to do; indecision and ossification are not viable options. Balanced with the MGC, coin holder voting with appropriate controls appears to be the least bad option. I understand people’s concerns about plutocracy. In this instance, coin holder voting is not the end all be all for the protocol, just for the lockbox funds, which they effectively fund anyway.
Zcash’s other forms of governance are extremely noisy right now - it is very difficult to tell who has skin in the game and who just has a lot of time on their hands. Holders are putting their money where their mouth is and frankly holding a sometimes tough to love asset (at this point I assume it’s because they believe in something bigger than price). It is the single strongest signal of alignment with the project - it should be treated as such in the governance of the protocol.
From the perspective of “Voice or Exit”, holders have not had much of a strong formal voice in governance to date. Besides some signaling polls and creative messages, the only form of communication has been the price of ZEC (let’s call this “Exit”). It’s possible that if we give coin holders a stronger form of “Voice”, they may chose that over “Exit”, which could make it more attractive to hold ZEC. This could improve the money attributes of ZEC while also improving sustainability for the ecosystem and everyone that depends on ZEC funding. It’s probably less the fact that they have a voice and more what they do with it that would lead to this outcome.