Well asked.
I agree with 1.
If I know the answer, or an answer to 2, that’s suggestive but not definitive.
Well asked.
I agree with 1.
If I know the answer, or an answer to 2, that’s suggestive but not definitive.
12% of the block reward is solely controlled by coin-holders.
8% is controlled by the ZCG.
12-8 = 4
Coinholders as an exclusive group have a the ONLY vote on the largest single chunk (by 4%) of ZEC outside of the ZEC paid to miners.
Given the above, either I am incorrect, or I am lying.. OR.. your assertion is incorrect.
Or maybe I am misunderstanding it.
Why do you say most coinholders have “no vote”?
As far as I can tell.. that’s not true.
This is not correct.
Whales are incentivised for ZEC to do well, as long as they are whales.
No more, no less. It’s for this reason that a “revolving door” concern applies to whales as well as minnows. In fact, there are easily imagined scenarios where whales are more likely to be “door revolvers” than minnows.
But isn’t possible to fork Zcash if whales vote for something controversial that the community don’t agree on.
There’s already Ycash, there will likely be more forks like Bitcoin has.
Zcash is specifically designed to make forking easy.
Some of the assertions are not really correct:
The ZCG needs the ZCAP to keep re-electing them
That is not true. ZCG is set in the block reward till 2028 I think. That is not contingent on ZCAP voting.
The ZCAP (many of which are recipients of grants and developers) need the ZCG to keep approving grants.
This is a major misunderstanding of ZCAP. You can see the members here:
It’s actually more like a collection of active forum members (the invite comes in a forum message AFAIK), as well as notable cryptography advocates.
In addition - Even if there are ZCG grant recipients in the panel, approving grants does not mean their specific grant will get approved.
Both are incentivised to continue justifying why grants need to keep getting approved for the ‘net benefit of the system’.
As shown earlier, this logic does not follow. Would multi-year grant recipients like QEDIT have an incentive to keep the dev reward for ZCG that gives them grants?
Yes.
So we should be more specific about what we are talking about here. Yes, ZCG does not have direct coinholder representation. Yet now there is THV that is a larger portion of the dev fund. So now we have both, with THV (tokenholders) having a larger portion.
What is the big problem that still exists? Why do we need change now? Is THV mature enough to maintain everything ZCG has done so far? Have you tried THV? Have you seen how THV works in places like Polkadot?
The proposal from @vaspholdings seems quite levelheaded here.
That is true, thanks for pointing that out. I have glossed over the 12%.
However, it’s my understanding (correct me if wrong) that the wording is “Funds will accumulate until the community reaches consensus on a decentralized mechanism.” From the ZIPs this doesn’t clearly define what ‘community’ is in this instance. So it could just be ZCAP or ZCAP 2.0?
The single most frustrating aspect of being part of this project, right there. Community left and right, nobody will ever tell you what it means.
(Not speaking on behalf of ZF)
No. Coin holders already control the lockbox. Why should they also control ZCG?
Also, the old “skin in the game” argument simply does not make sense. If ZEC tanks, the Winklevoss won’t lose a night’s sleep over it, but the random Zcash enthusiast who might have 50% of what they own invested will have a bad time. It’s sad that something this obvious needs to be pointed out but that’s the ultimate downside of working with cryptocurrency.
Oh ok, so we should adapt Zcash so we’re like the savior of people who invest but can’t be bothered to diversity. What a ridiculous take.
Personally I have never asked for control over ZCG. However yes, I do want stakeholders to have control over the inflation. An on/off switch on ZCG & lockbox spending if you will. They do what they want, but if it’s not aligned with stakeholders interests then guess what.
That is a very loose quote from ZIP 1015, which created the 12% lockbox. The actual quote is:
No disbursement mechanism is currently defined for this “lockbox”; the Zcash community will need to decide upon and specify a suitable decentralized mechanism for permitting withdrawals from this lockbox in a future ZIP in order to make these funds available for funding grants to ecosystem participants.
That community decision has already been made, and the result was ZIP 1016 which explicitly specified that the “decentralized mechanism” for using the lockbox funds was coinholder voting.
What would you prefer @conradoplg:
On the first point, I’m starting to think that the dev fund may lead to a fork. Which I’m fine with. But an even better outcome may be peace between us all, which could happen with no dev fund at all.
We could certainly make the current lockbox fund donation based, or just fund projects directly and privately, and work that way instead.
As for the second point, I’m just curious of your position.
Thanks.
Maybe I am missing something, but that does not seem to be the situation.
ZIP 1016 states:
The Key-Holder Organizations collectively administer the Coinholder-Controlled Fund based on decisions taken by coinholder voting, following a model decided by the community and specified in another ZIP [TBD].
The confusion lies in that there IS NO on chain governance for the 12% lockbox as it currently stands, what we have is merely the promise of an administrative poll. Currently the funds sit and relies on multisig of humans (‘trusted individuals’) to fulfill their promise. It is a discretionary poll, which can technically be vetoed.
A true THV means the code moves the money, not a comittee of key holders giving permission.
As it stands the ZIP is a promise with no clearly defined mechanism for disbursing the funds and is kicking the can down the road (TBD). It is even unclear what ‘community’ is defined as.
We don’t have on chain governance for the 12% lockbox, we have a promise of a discretionary poll.
Please let me know if I have misunderstood the facts.
Token holders voting means exactly what it says. Nothing else, nothing more.
On-chain governance is what you seem to be confusing with token holders voting.
Yes thanks for clarifying.
outgoing.doze:
- Full control of the dev fund from stakeholders or no dev fund at all?
- PoW as it is, or PoW+PoS as is currently developed?
0. Seats on ZCG voted by coinholders
Why not that first?
Sure, why not. It’s just not my preference.
I simply like that ZCG is fully independent in how they function. However, with stakeholders having an on/off switch over their budget, they’d know who they are working for. And if we play funky games with them they could resign and that’d be a loss for stakeholders. The way I see it, it would put things in balance.
There are many good approaches we can try. But I’d rather we get rid of the dev fund than get 10 years of distracting bickering. We can take this privately between large stakeholders. Less good, but also less distracting.
I can see a guild of the 21k+ ZEC stakeholders being formed, that would fund things as they see fit and have a governance they like. I think the ecosystem has more to gain from the dev fund being governed by all stakeholders at large.
I think @conradoplg is completely correct here. 1 ZEC is not the same to me as it is to Tyler Winklevoss. (No offence Tyler, we’re just at different places in our lives right now.)
This comment here, officer.