Protect the integrity of the monetary base supply schedule

Aye. While many proposals involve “throwing away” Dev Fund ZEC in some cases, the mechanism of “throwing away” coins is mostly an orthogonal matter, and may be implementing either burning or by assigning the coins to various parties past or future.

@mistfpga had the excellent idea of creating a Supplemental ZIP enumerating how coins can be “thrown away”, and having full proposals choose from this menu.

The menu would include (off the top of my head):

  • simple burn
  • burning, but delaying the halving to restore total
  • distributing to past miners (within some time window)
  • distributing to future miners (within some time window)
  • redirection to discretionary spending by some designated entity
  • redirection to spending by some consensus enforced mechanisms, such as:
    • a “shielded adoption incentivization fund” that would pay interest on ZEC held in z-addresses

Side notes:

  • Regarding securities regulations consideration: as discussed elsewhere there is a big difference between burning done by an “[active participant that] controls the creation and issuance of the digital asset” (quoting the SEC framework) versus having a community-approved consensus rule that does so automatically and without the discretion of any participant.
  • Distributing to past miners isn’t great in terms of incentives (unlike distributing to future miners, it doesn’t increase security), and it also may create operational and tax issues by “airdropping” coins on people who happened to do some mining a year before.
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