Do you think ZCG should have a Quality filter? How would you evaluate Quality?
Quality isn’t a vibe, it’s a function.
For ZCG, a quality filter should be evaluable the same way we evaluate technical reliability: clear requirements, observable outputs, and low variance in delivery.
It comes down to 3 checks:
– Specification quality: are goals, interfaces, and dependencies defined tightly enough that progress is measurable?
– Execution quality: does the team have a record of shipping on time, to spec, without generating operational load for others?
– Resilience quality: does the work reduce fragility in the broader system, or introduce new maintenance or governance burdens?
If a proposal scores high on all three, it’s quality. If any one of them fails, it’s not.
ShieldOrder
Thanks @ShieldOrder for answering some tough questions.
Is the Zcash Community Grants an independent Zcash Entity?
Should the CEO’s , Executive Directors , Operational Directors of current Zcash organizations seat on or actively participate in ZCG meetings?
How will you push the Zcash Community Grants to be an Independent Entity?
Thank you in advance
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ZCG is not an independent entity today. It operates as a committee under the Zcash Foundation, a U.S. nonprofit with its own legal obligations. That’s the current structure, not a philosophical choice.
For me the boundary is clear: ZCG should be operationally independent in its decision-making, but the legal encumbrance stays with the entity that receives the Dev Fund slice. That separation prevents protocol-level control from drifting into institutional hands.
As for participation: executives from ECC, ZF, or Shielded Labs should attend when relevant, but they shouldn’t sit as voting members. Input is useful; influence over outcomes should remain strictly with ZCAP-mandated committee members.
On independence going forward: I support structures that enhance resilience and reduce single-jurisdiction risk, but only where these do not introduce new chokepoints and/or governance burden. Any shift has to make the system harder to coerce, not more complicated to run.
ShieldOrder
This is incorrect. ZCG is currently a committee under FPF, a Cayman incorporated non-profit. Zcash Foundation has no connection with ZCG.
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Thanks for the correction, you’re right. ZCG is a committee under FPF, not the Zcash Foundation.
My point was about the structural separation: the entity that receives the Dev Fund slice carries the legal encumbrance; the committee’s role is operational and decision-making. That boundary is what matters for keeping protocol-level autonomy intact.
Appreciate the clarification.
ShieldOrder
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And.. to reiterate our earlier discussion you’re not opposed to entities that fall outside any current well-defined jurisdiction, you’re simply pragmatic about their implementation?
Would you be opposed to a feasible-and-pragmatic governance structure that was unencumbered by any standard nation-state jurisdiction?
Not opposed at all. The requirement is that it works in practice. A governance structure that avoids single jurisdiction exposure is a valid option if it keeps responsibilities clear, keeps authority bounded, and avoids creating new choke points or coordination fragility.
Jurisdiction independence is a design space, not a goal in itself. If a model can be implemented with reliability, auditability, and low operational risk, then it deserves evaluation on the same terms as any other option.
ShieldOrder
I have a few more questions. I hope I am not “hogging the mike”.
First, I read this sentence… many times:
Are those things mutually exclusive?
I have posted here a tentative idea about a cycle relating privacy to governance, in that formulation, I think perhaps there are necessarily simultaneous goals, one of which could perhaps be described as “cultivating the design space”.
Second, you mention the word “strategy”.
How do you define that? And perhaps, share which lineages or resources you might cite as informing your relationship to this concept?
Jurisdiction independence can be a goal when it improves resilience, but it is still a design choice. Goals have to be testable. A design space is for exploring tradeoffs. Keeping the distinction clear avoids ambiguity. The filter is simple. Does the structure reduce coercive surfaces without adding fragility.
I read your privacy and governance loop. Privacy is necessary but not sufficient. Loops only hold when each link has explicit boundaries that keep the system from collapsing under complexity. That is the part I focus on.
Strategy is the selection of constraints and priorities that guide decisions over time. This comes from systems engineering and operational design. Clear constraints make consistent outcomes easier.
ShieldOrder
Verification for Large Treasury Handlers
Total runway across ZCG, the Lockbox, and receivables is 381 860 ZEC (about $206M at current pricing).
At this scale, any group that manages a material share of community funds should provide routine verification.
Two acceptable forms:
• annual independent audit
• or quarterly view-key balance proof with a simple cost table
Apply the same rule to all contractors handling community funds, including FPF, Shielded Labs, legal services, and future operators.
No exceptions.
Standard practice for a long-horizon treasury.
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How do you evaluate the role of local communities within the Zcash ecosystem? In your view, how critical are local communities for Zcash’s global growth, awareness building, and adoption? Do you see this as a driving force for progress, and how seriously do you personally take this aspect?
If you are elected to ZCG, what will be your perspective on proposals focused on local community development? Which criteria will you prioritize when reviewing such proposals? For example, how will you approach factors like sustainability, community impact, measurable outcomes, cost-effectiveness, transparency, and alignment with the broader ecosystem? Additionally, how do you believe local community initiatives should contribute long-term value to Zcash?
Thanks for the thoughtful question.
Local communities matter, but my evaluation still runs through the same filters I use on every proposal: impact, clarity, and alignment.
Impact means the work has a measurable effect on Zcash adoption, resilience, or understanding. Community initiatives can meet that bar when they create sustained usage or lower friction for the broader ecosystem. One-off activity without a clear outcome is harder to justify.
Clarity means milestones, deliverables, and timelines must be concrete enough that progress or drift is visible to everyone, not just the team doing the work.
Alignment means the initiative fits inside Zcash’s core mission: privacy, self-custody, and sound economics.
If elected, I’ll apply these filters uniformly. Good community-driven work can be valuable, but it still needs structure, clear outputs, and a path to durability. The goal is not to expand the budget surface, but to direct it toward work that compounds over time.
ShieldOrder
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I entered the Zcash ecosystem long before the current market cycle.
My position has been consistent: private money requires written treasury discipline that does not drift with conditions.
My filters exist to make good work easier to fund, not harder.
ShieldOrder
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Hi @ShieldOrder , welcome to the race!
Question: how do you plan to make sure your ZCG decisions reflect the needs of Zcash users and represent the community?
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Thanks for the question. My approach is simple.
I use the same 3 filters for every decision: Impact, Clarity, and Alignment. They are applied uniformly so applicants, users, and the community can predict and audit the reasoning.
Representation follows from transparency and evidence, not personal preference. Each assessment is written in plain terms so any user can challenge it or point to counter evidence.
ZCG is a fiduciary body, not a gatekeeper. The community sets direction through proposals, forum discussion, and ZIP processes. My role is to surface tradeoffs clearly, enforce consistent standards, and protect long horizon funds for measurable user benefit.
When reasoning is public and standards are stable, community intent is naturally reflected.
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Verification of large treasury handlers
Under ZIP 1014, Zcash Community Grants received 8% of block rewards through the 2nd halving. With NU6 that 8% continued, and 12% began to accrue in a protocol lockbox. NU6.1 now moved that 12% into a coinholder-directed fund under ZIP 1016, while ZCG continues to receive the 8% stream.
At current pricing, the combined long-horizon runway for grants and retroactive programs is in nine-figure territory. When scale and horizon change, the governance surface changes with them.
The committee is transparent and has maintained continuity across cycles. The gap that now exists is structural. At this magnitude, a minimal verification layer becomes necessary.
The requirement is simple. For any entity holding more than $5M equivalent of community treasury funds for longer than 12 months, a uniform and lightweight proof standard should apply. Two mechanisms satisfy it:
• an annual independent financial audit; or
• a narrow read-only view key with a quarterly balance and cost table aligned to approved allocations
The view-key option is deliberately constrained. It confirms custody and allocation adherence only. It confers no spending authority and does not reach into operations.
This preserves the separation of duties as they stand today.
ZCG allocates.
Custodians execute.
Verification sits above operations, not inside them.
At smaller scale, the existing structure was sufficient. At the present scale, the absence of continuous proof weakens clarity and increases long-horizon risk. This is not a critique of any custodian. It is a scale-adjustment rule.
The same evaluation filters apply here.
Impact: resources do not drift.
Clarity: spending is visible and verifiable.
Alignment: funds remain within mission and scope.
A long-horizon treasury without minimal verification weakens all three. Adding this layer strengthens the existing process rather than altering it.
Clear positions from candidates on whether they support a uniform verification rule at this scale will help the community understand the governance surface going forward. The scale and structure have changed for all custodians and all committees.
ShieldOrder
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Thanks for highlighting this distinction.
But how are you going to decide what the “community” wants? Who is the community?
For example, how would you decide whether or not to fund ZSAs?
For me the answer is straightforward.
ZCG does not decide what the community wants. The community expresses its preferences through ZIPs, ZCAP signals, and coinholder polls.
ZCG’s job is narrower. It is to evaluate proposals against clear criteria:
impact, clarity, alignment, deliverability, and verification.
For something like ZSAs, my own preference is irrelevant. I would look at the formal signals the community has already given, the technical readiness, the milestones, and the verification path.
If the work is aligned with the protocol roadmap, scoped clearly, and deliverable with measurable outputs, it passes. If not, it does not.
That is what I mean by fiduciary, not gatekeeper.