As stated before, when ideas are being debated on this forum, some input from ZF reps would be good, at the moment ECC has a monopoly on communication.
Hopefully that will lead to a more streamlined development flow. From an outsider looking in it appears the 2 orgs don’t know what the other is doing which is bonkers IMO
Daira did mention that ECC devs and ZF devs communicate with each other on a regular basis.
Instructions unclear. Aping in to BONK.
I think it’s more that there was a miscommunication such that ZF wasn’t aware how much of ECC’s work — including a great deal of the work that also supported Zashi — was directly on the critical path to deprecating zcashd.
The way I remember it, (as well as moral support) you contributed to the cryptographic engineering decision to use binding signatures to enforce both balance and nonmalleability, which was one of the unresolved issues in the Sapling design at that point.
FWIW, the Zcash community did vote.
This might form the basis for a variation of the infinite monkey theorem. 
That was certainly a factor. For my part, I regret not engaging more with the ECC engineers. If I had done, the degree of overlap between (a) the work on the wallet stack to mitigate the impact of the Sandblasting attack on light wallets, and (b) launching Zashi, would have been apparent.
this vote happened in 2021, it’s a shame that we have not been able to get anything done from back then! we are moving too slow!
never thought i would agree with @jelly5649 but coin voting is the only way to move forward! until we have that, those that should be in charge of the protocol have little to no power to change anything.
What exactly do you mean by this?
Agreed. Token vote is the only real way to vote.
Controversial opinion: forking is the only way to vote.
Voting presumes that there is a centralized party that can enforce the results of an election. I personally want systems that don’t permit the existence of such centralized parties.
However, forking is of course a nuclear option. What is missing is a way to reconcile and recover after a fork. So one technical approach that would be interesting to consider is: could the protocol be adapted such that the need to merge after a fork is also anticipated and supported?
how will a non dev fork the chain?
everyone that is holding coins can vote, but not everyone with coins can fork.
anyone that is not holding coins can’t vote, but anyone that knows how to code can fork the protocol.
since those that are buying coins are funding all the development, it’s a nobrainer that these should be the ones in charge.
imagine if we had 15 different chains, and none of these actually reached a large amount of people, nobody would take them serious. and what would happen to jobs like yours? that thought doesn’t click in my mind! so why not trying to make one chain great and implement something that gives the power to those that are financing all of this?
Coin Voting is the way to move forward and most likely the best option that we currently have.
Quick question, do you treat shielded votes different from transparent votes? Reason I ask: CEX abuse (If they can, they will eventually)
Should voters take on the risk of self custody?
I’m generally not in favor of DAOs and in particular treasuries; at best they’re a stepping stone to better models.
When I talk about a fork-and-merge model, it’s pretty open-ended, but support for merges would also require us to significantly change our idea of what “forking” means. For example, I’m purely speculating here, but what if a consensus node were to run multiple “forks” and prevent “double-spending” across the different sets of consensus rules, with the option to burn outputs on one fork to make them available on the other fork? Something like that would probably be necessary to make merges possible.
I want to unpack this question a bit, because it’s interesting. Pretty much by definition, a non-dev can’t fork the chain, even under coin voting, because ultimately someone has to do the work to make the consensus fork, get it adopted by miners/stakers, etc. and if the there’s not somebody who is going to do whatever the votes decide, the only recourse of the is for the people who feel disenfranchised (either by the vote being ignored, or by them being in a minority) to vote with their feet.
Given the fundamental reality of this circumstance, I think that for collective funding, retroactive funding models are probably a better approach than treasuries. They come with their own challenges, but you then have less opportunities for priorities diverging from what is funded.
Another way to approach retroactive funding is a bounty model. The downside to bounties is that there’s a risk of fast solutions being preferred over good solutions (in particular, i’m worried about fast solutions that involve sacrificing privacy.)
Amen!!! 
I can’t exactly start my own country if I don’t agree with the US (Fed) policies, but if there was a method to verifiably prove members of a community voted (sans mail-in ballot shenanigans), then I would at least feel like my vote wasn’t for naught.
Sorry but this doesn’t exist in the real world.
Perfect is the enemy of good, and forking a chain is a hyperbolic idea for voting on what should be funded and what shouldn’t at the expense of the people providing the funding in the first place.
forks are pointless we shouldnt even be laughing about the idea after a decade of zcash forks are just as bad as splitting the dev teams in half to make a theater about decentralization. we all see it now after one planning mistake to another between ECC vs Foundation. look at what happened after the soviet union got balkanized there is an example of how dumb it is to fork fork fork fork fork
If nobody can give a dozen reasons why its better to have two main orgs over one then its prob time for a proposal to combine them… all the engineers under one roof would make things thousand times more efficient cut all the crap like taxes boards of directors advisors other bs middle men. cut all of that extra fat in half so that more energy can go into making zcash great again. i know this isnt the same thread but im happy to have checked in and see that the trademark is getting dropped fwiw set zcash free
This actually proves my point.
When a private company is tanking, provably inefficient, and run rates get tighter and tighter, you trim all the fat to increase efficiency. Cut unnecessary red tape asap.
Failing countries keep taxing and punish their constituents. They keep the red tape regardless of how it has been affecting people or the provable inefficiencies.
Zcash feels more like a state governed by few. No need for multiple governing bodies. Useless fat needs to be cut for hyper-efficiency.
