ZCG and the Dev Fund: Timeline for Proposals and Polling

Sorry, whats the reason NU7 should have gone out later?

Orphan rates at launch went great, far better than initially predicted, and we had the expected iterative improvement for it to keep going well immediately after under unprecedented load in years.

@vaspholdings what is the well-founded technical objection that NU7 should have gone out later?

Coming back to the financial comparison I offered earlier, I’ve gone through the latest proposal texts, the dashboard and FPF’s Q3 report. A useful starting point: the reported USD cash already covers the listed unpaid grant milestones; so we shouldn’t assume those commitments depend on selling ZEC.

The dashboard with balances referenced to 12 November, shows:

Amount
ZEC 94,349.71
USD cash $8.75m
Approved but unpaid grant milestones $2.25m
Cash remaining after reserving for those milestones $6.50m

Checking the unpaid milestone total against the underlying rows; it adds up. The dashboard is marked “Updates required”, though, and we still need to confirm what other obligations sit outside that figure. Worth noting that Cash above listed commitments isn’t automatically surplus.

Here’s how I understand the four options:

  • Status quo: Keep the existing treasury and the 8% funding stream until the third halving. New grants continue under the current rules.

  • ZAP: Keep the existing treasury and the 8% funding stream until the third halving. New grants continue, with the proposed adoption assessment.

  • Future Dev & Legal Defense Fund: Remove 50,000 ZEC to the NSM and redirect the 8% stream to the new lockbox after activation. ZCG continues making grants from its remaining treasury.

  • Wind-down: Stop new grants at activation, reserve enough for existing commitments and closure costs, and transfer the residual to the future lockbox administrator once the prerequisites are met. Redirect the 8% stream to the new lockbox after activation, if it is still active.

    Also, the revised wind-down proposal sends the residual treasury to the future lockbox administrator, accounted for separately from the on-chain lockbox. It doesn’t automatically send that balance to the NSM. ZAP and status quo have the same starting resources. The difference is how grants would be assessed. All four options leave the existing CCF and its 12% stream unchanged.

To put the 50,000 ZEC removal in context, here is the same treasury, less the same listed commitments, at different prices:

ZEC price Without the removal After the removal
$903.80 $91.77m $46.58m
$451.90 $49.13m $26.54m
$225.95 $27.82m $16.52m

I used $903.80 because that was the quote captured in the dashboard export then halved and quartered it. These are comparisons, not forecasts abnd they exclude future receipts, other assets and any obligations or costs not captured above.

The removal is roughly 53% of the reported ZEC holdings. That is a substantial reduction in funding for future work, but it doesn’t itself consume the USD cash covering the listed milestones. I’m less comfortable putting a “years of runway” number next to these balances. The FPF report shows expenses of $1.53m in Q1, $3.19m in Q2 and $1.82m in Q3. Security bounties account for a significant part of the variation. Picking one period and extending it indefinitely could give a misleading answer.

The same applies to lockboxes: earmarked funds may support future work, but only once there is a functioning route to approve and pay for it. Under wind-down, new ZCG awards could stop before that replacement route is available.

Could FPF/ZCG help confirm whether the $2.25m captures all outstanding commitments, including contractor and administrative obligations, and provide an updated asset reconciliation? A forward spending budget would then let us turn this into a proper cash-flow comparison.

For the proposal authors, the remaining questions are activation timing, transition costs and when redirected funds could actually reach teams. Those would help us judge how much flexibility each option leaves, rather than relying on a large dollar balance at today’s ZEC price.

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@valardragon, good to see you joining this thread. I know you’re busy!

I think you’re confusing two different comments. (One of them not mine.)

@daira said NU7 could have benefited from a few more weeks. I didn’t.

I argued that her technical objections about unfinished specifications and ecosystem readiness deserved answers.

If you think I suggested NU7 should have been delayed, could you point me to where I said that?

I’m pleased to hear NU7’s orphan rates were better than expected. That’s good news!

But my original questions concern the proposed further reduction from 25-second to 20-second blocks.

I’d suggested observing how 25-second blocks perform on mainnet for longer before polling on another reduction.

  • What orphan rate do you expect at 20 seconds on mainnet, based on the results so far?

  • How would that affect smaller independent miners compared with larger, better-connected pools? Is there a risk of increasing mining centralisation?

  • Can the block-time change be deployed independently of the other NU7.1 proposals?

Those are the questions I’m asking. Not whether NU7 should have been delayed.

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Both technical implementations of society-affecting monetary systems such as cryptocurrency and traditional governments such as nation states have governance processes. They need not be the same thing in letter to be comparable in practice. In both cases, plutocratic control over its governance process is a political risk to the entity in question.

Your inability or more likely unwillingness to acknowledge this obvious fact makes you a threat to it and to me.

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My evidence comes from running or being a part of higher output companies or ecosystems.

The problem identified is that a few people cant keep up with many other people who are performing at a higher output.

This is a personal problem, not a technical one. I offered suggestions that work for me to stay on top of things 14-18 hours a day 7 days a week without burnout. Other things work for other people. I know many others that are capable of this and its just a matter of committing to it.

We can not afford to be blocked by anyone who is personally not capable of keeping up. If one wants to work 8 hours a day 5 days a week that’s fine, but this makes one unsuitable for being in a critical role that limits Zcash progress.

@thowar2, that’s the cost of going faster than review can keep up.

Zcash isn’t short of people willing to work hard. It just doesn’t have many reviewers knowledgeable enough to catch the next Orchard bug before an attacker does.

Review isn’t a race. More hours don’t make a cryptographic proof correct, and tired reviewers miss things. This year’s Orchard vulnerability is a reminder of what’s at stake.

And it isn’t only engineers. Exchanges, wallet providers, hardware-wallet makers and miners have their own schedules. They won’t work 18-hour days to keep up with us, nor should they.

Under rough consensus, substantiated objections get answered on their merits. You don’t get to sideline the people raising them for working normal hours.

Given the cadence of your posts, nobody doubts your stamina, Tom. But let’s not make stamina the test for who gets a say.

And the questions I first asked three days ago are still waiting for an answer: ZCG and the Dev Fund: Timeline for Proposals and Polling - #55 by vaspholdings
(Dev has since partly answered one of them. Appreciated.)

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I do appreciate a well written spec, especially for distributed systems creating multiple implementations, but this is a tool that is not always appropriate. Decreasing block times seems like one of those, the spec itself is parameter changes (and noting dependencies in those parameter changes). It is not heavy lift in comparison to more complex updates, and can be quickly defined.

The safety check is mostly related to how the change affects a complex p2p system, which is more suited to individuals actually running the network. Simulations, testnet runs, observing incremental changes to productions are all great strategies for proving it works safely that do not rely on a specification at all. In fact some of the problems in p2p that have been fixed could not be discovered via spec at all, and are only observable by monitoring the network in practice.

I’m very grateful that Zcash has many highly experienced network engineers with experience scaling up other performant chains, though I’m disappointed that they seem to be underrepresented in the ZIP editor process, which is why I question whether that is the correct venue for these types of changes.

Such a contentious statement, one that will probably plague decaying industrialized nations for years to come.

On one hand I can totally understand people that don’t want to behave like machines, but on the other hand those who do should not be impeded in any ways. Just let those suckers do the hard work so we can all reap the benefits :rofl:

Dude, the freedom to work as hard as you like does not confer the right to impose the resulting risks on everyone else.

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There’s a quote from Alexis de Tocqueville I really like:

"Society will develop a new kind of servitude which covers the surface of society with a network of complicated rules, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate. It does not tyrannise but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”

Sorry, but Zcash purpose is not to mirror the nanny state. Live free or die trying. Fear tactics are not welcome here.

The “noting dependencies in those parameter changes” is exactly one of the things that we would have gotten wrong in NU7, were it not for @str4d’s careful eye - necessary changes to the funding stream configuration didn’t correctly take the block height changes into account! This is exactly why you see people asking for more time to review - because we had a close shave with network consistency.

Anyone who’s willing to do the work can become a ZIP editor. It’s a job, and honestly not a fun one. But it actually matters.

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Tom, sit down. You’re embarrassing yourself.

Specs are a necessity, always, for every protocol change. How do you think the Orchard vuln was found? By comparing the implementation with the specs.

Testing is complementary to specs, it does not replace them.

We do have multiple implementations and Zcash is a distributed system, so you’re arguing against yourself there. If by “individuals actually running the network” you mean mining pool operators and infrastructure / devops people — then no, they don’t generally have the expertise. (I know because I’m in all of the Telegram/Signal/Slack channels with them, and they don’t claim that expertise.) If you mean protocol developers and incident response teams — then yes, that’s precisely what I’m saying, and those people definitely want thorough specs. Some people may have multiple hats —they are both protocol devs / incident responders and run infrastructure— but it’s the former that matters.

Protocol design is one of the more complicated things that people can do. It is easy to make mistakes. It is easy for even very experienced people, with frontier AI helping them to whatever extent they want, to make mistakes. There is no discontinuity that means we all have to start doing things your way. Everything I’ve learnt doing this for 11 years (and more, back when I was doing safety-critical programming) is actually more applicable than ever. The reality is that my insistence on rigorous specs and careful review throughout that period is only looking more prescient every day, and is one of our key assets that is deeply complementary to AI.

Do not confuse being able to quickly define it with whether it can get away without review. Everything requires review; everything can have mistakes.

The example you’re talking about happens to be similar to an upgrade that we’ve only recently done as part of NU7. In particular, we’ve just recently found out the ways in which the people who thought that change was simple were wrong, and we can remember those ways and how to avoid them — by doing a proper technical review and writing thorough specs. So yes, for now (before much else has changed that might interact), that might be one of the easier changes to make again. That situation doesn’t generalize and doesn’t support your wider point, or your shitty attitude.

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Update: Coinholder polling is live. Participate using Vizor, ZODL, or Zkool.

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The ZCAP poll, and other community panel polls, will open later today.

All polls close Tuesday, December 1 at 2:59 a.m. UTC.

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It should have gone out later because there literally wasn’t enough time to publish the full specs for NU7 before activation, or to properly check them against the implementations. Protocol spec: Apply the NU7 ZIPs by daira · Pull Request #1446 · zcash/zips · GitHub could only be merged on November 10, four days after activation.

The risk of a serious network failure, for example a chain fork between Zakura and Zebra, was substantially increased by that. I did in fact cross-check Zakura and Zebra against the ZIPs on the day before activation, but it probably would have been too late to do anything about it if there had been any discrepancy.

I suspect your first instinct will be to claim that this had already been checked. But I know it hadn’t been, because there were spec errors that I had to fix in that PR. Fortunately they were minor.

Why did I not do that earlier? Because I was dealing with various life stuff that was not postponable (including, for example, dealing with the some of the fallout of the governance dispute).

Please note: no-one else updated those specs, and no-one else was going to update them, despite me having done everything I could to decentralize and spread expertise. We clearly do not have the necessary redundancy and collective will among Zcash organizations to keep specifications, even just for the core consensus, up to date. That is a problem. There is an imbalance between the rush to implement new stuff and the consolidation of specs and other documentation, that will cause maintenance problems and increase security risks.

That lack of respect for the importance of specs is precisely what I’m pushing back against in this subthread. In several cases, Zcash orgs have just implemented things that break interoperability, such as fee changes or undocumented changes to the key derivation tree, without any attempt to obtain feedback from other protocol developers, or even communicate to us before deployment that a change had been made. (Often this is for changes that make other software look like it is broken, not the software that is failing to implement the spec.)

The specification and assurance backlog is also a consequence of having been overloaded with work ever since the AIpocalypse of security issues starting in March, and never having been given a humane timescale on which to recover from that, before launching into a campaign of trying to optimize everything now now now. I am not exaggerating when I say that I view this as violence to my and others’ work-life balance and relationships. I am sick of the arrogance, entitlement, and disrespect that has been shown toward long-standing protocol contributors in this period.

I don’t want to be overly dramatic, but honestly the closest analogy I can think of to how we are operating Zcash right now is the Space Shuttle programme. On each Shuttle mission, it was estimated with hindsight that the risk of a catastrophic failure ranged between 1-in-10 and 1-in-90 (for most of the programme lifetime, between 1-in-21 and 1-in-47). Ours is somewhere within that range per minor Network Upgrade. For major upgrades like the original launch, Sapling, and NU5, and emergency upgrades like NU6.2, it’s likely much higher. Tachyon will be in the same category unless we change course.

(Source: Shuttle Risk Progression Per Flight, Space Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance Office, NASA, June 2011.)

At that failure rate you’re likely to get away with quite a few launches. On the 25th flight, the crew of the Challenger died. (I was 11, I remember vividly seeing it on the news. And I remember reading the reports, later, about why it happened and all of the missed opportunities to prevent it.) On the 113th flight, the crew of the Columbia died, and with them the future of the Shuttle programme.

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If they can find a problem I can’t, good on them.

If they have unfounded opinions that it’s safe without evidence, I will treat those opinions as unfounded, and encourage others to.

See? I don’t insinuate. I say what I mean.

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I strongly disagree with this of course.

I suspect your first instinct will be to claim that this had already been checked. But I know it hadn’t been, because there were spec errors that I had to fix in that PR. Fortunately they were minor.

The discrepancies between Zebra and Zakura at the time were well known in regtest and custom testnets, which are not mainnet consensus.

Zcash orgs have just implemented things that break interoperability, such as fee changes or undocumented changes to the key derivation tree, without any attempt to obtain feedback from other protocol developers, or even communicate to us before deployment that a change had been made.

I think there is severe misunderstanding of what components require broad consensus and what don’t. Who is “us”?

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The problem is that we can’t wait for you to be proven wrong. If you’re proven wrong by a serious vulnerability that happened due to rushing, then it’s too late. It is my job, literally, to prevent that from happening.

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ZODL and ZF, or anyone monitoring the R&D Discord or the zips repo, or anyone outside the Zakura, Valar Group, and Vizor teams as far as I could tell.

There is disagreement on what components require broad consensus, not misunderstanding on my part. The need for broad consensus is not limited to the consensus protocol proper. This should be obvious because, for instance, non-coinbase note encryption is not in consensus-proper, and payments would not work at all without agreement on note encryption.

Edit: @shieldedmark has said that the summary on the Arborist call, which is why I thought that you had advocated for wallets to adopt 400 zats, was his misinterpretation/miscommunication of what you said. I apologize and withdraw my related criticisms below.

Example: Zakura and Vizor, apparently in private coordination, lowered their implementations of the ZIP 317 marginal fee to 400 zats, without any warning to the rest of the ecosystem or documentation before deployment. This was soon after ZIP 2009 (specifying a marginal fee of 1000 zats) had been agreed among all parties — including, IIRC, representatives of Zakura who had not indicated any plans to do anything else.

This ignored the fact that Zebra would drop those transactions without relaying them, as ZIP 317 permits. (The ZIP does allow relaying transactions below the conventional fee, as zcashd did but Zebra does not.) This is obviously an interoperability problem: Vizor transactions were [edit: would have been] dropped by Zebra.

To anticipate a possible objection, of course the Vizor devs are allowed to have a broken wallet that produces transactions that don’t propagate through some nodes. Their users may complain, but there have been plenty of broken wallets.

Where it becomes problematic is that I have reason to suspect that, by making a change privately coordinated between Zakura and Vizor, the funders of those orgs were attempting to bounce the rest of the ecosystem into accepting a unilateral and undiscussed marginal fee change. If I hadn’t pushed back, that would have succeeded: Zebra would have given in to this effective coercion and started relaying and possibly mining those transactions, potentially exposing the network and all of its users —not just Vizor or Zakura users— to a sandblasting-like DoS attack. (Even if you disagree about the DoS potential, the fact is that no public analysis had been done of that possibility. Zakura or Vizor’s private analysis is not enough; the rest of the network pays the cost and so its representatives must consent.)

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“us” on which thing? Understood that from now on, you would prefer interpretation of ZODL and ZF as a unified entity.

On a mempool admission policy, where.a mempool can tolerate lower fees than the current wallet standard, Shielded Labs was in discussions, Vizor was not. But its also strictly a miner level policy, and that too the standard of every other blockchain?

Why would mempool admission policy be in the zips repo, or a discord that doesn’t do anything? Its not a consensus rule or wallet privacy standard.

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