Yes, that’s true, and consistent with what I wrote.
I think that it reflects a desire to do just what it says, ‘keep it simple’ , for this reason I think we should hesitate to add any more complexity [which] would signal that we should leave the Foundation in charge of major grants as already specified in your proposal, and not make totally new entity to decide the major grants.
You raise a good point, but frankly I find the difference very minor in practice, when ZF voluntarily creates that committee anyway. And if the committee is created anyway, then it’s good to make its decision binding.
I suspect the difference could be huge in practice, since most people are already familiar with and have expressed trust in the Zcash Foundation. What if the community thinks the new dev fund committee is misusing its huge power over the major grants? The Foundation stated they would defer to the committee unless there is a legal conflict, so there would be no credible recourse for the community.
Part of trust in the Zcash Foundation is that we trust the Foundation will respond to legitimate community criticism. That trust has been built over years and making a new unaccountable committee seems risky to me.
@aristarchus, this is a question of prediction and risk-estimation that’s difficult to settle, but let me just point out that it’s the Foundation itself that proposed to bind itself this way…
The market has also given us a strong positive signal that we are going in the right direction. This cannot be a coincidence. Not in a downtrend like this while none of the other altcoins are gaining value.
Disagree. This is most likely random market fluctuation, meaning a coincidence. Even if it wasn’t, a small altcoin like Zcash could be easily manipulated to create a fake “market sentiment”. I believe that it wouldn’t be a difficult job for wealthy “early backers” of Zcash, they’d be the ones directly benefited from extension of Founders’ rewards.
Also, Zcash wasn’t the only altcoin gaining value in same period. For example, Tezos.
The burden of proof would be on you because you tried to correlate market movement with support for extension of founders’ reward.
Irrelevant since most didnt.
Heres my proof the ZEC/ETH pair chart. The dates are the same.
You cherry picked the date and trading pair. By your own logic I would say market disagreed with this by declining in value since this " Community Sentiment Collection" restarted in early November.
Good, but perhaps it should’ve been stated earlier before I tried to say that market movement is meaningless. Now it seems I was the one bringing price speculation craps into this thread while in fact I’m not.
On miner votes.
I don’t know why miners not casting votes in blocks isn’t treated as their favor to status quo. Existing miners, investors, users in this platform joined because they bought into original plan of the project. Unless they explicitly signal their preference to change, the silence should be perceived as agreement with original plan. Also, it should be mentioned that most of miners and users are uninformed about this massive change.
This project adopted Satoshi’s Proof of Work consensus mechanism, so why don’t we let it works its way? None of these polls really matter.
No you werent I was and I apologize I will respond to your counter claims in a more appropriate place after I at least get some work done.
We all know what the miners do when they dont agree with the decisions . They fork the chain like they did with ETH/ETC and BTC/BCH. We cannot assume absence of interest for a vote against the DEV fund. And now you have made an off-topic post because check title.
Pretty sure that’s already how a board-formed committee would work? I think we’re a little over-involved in this part of the structure. If the Foundation wants to do it this way and has the legal power, they can just as easily stop doing it this way.
Perhaps - although there’s value in having some oversight of MG, especially from an org thats trusted and beholden to the community.
MG would be new and in control of significant funds - being able the ‘do whatever provided ZFnd is not unhappy’ seems a good operating mode. Good ‘training wheels’.
This would help protect MG from lobbying, coercion & capture etc - ZFnd could react to anything against their charter or the community.
Another thing is the ZF is committed to transparency. Will the MG committee be transparent and verifiably free from self-dealing? Will the MG committee be compensated for their time and expertise? We are already paying the foundation to act in the interest of the Community and they are doing a good job, but do we want to also pay 5 more people to make informed decisions?
I guess I just see a lot of negatives to a MG committee and I not significant benefits.
Thanks for your feedback @aristarchus. A few responses below and suggestions for our final poll:
The Foundation board (and I) did not ignore the support behind this proposal. It’s listed as one of the leading proposals in our initial analysis, and our lack of support (and support for ZIP 1012) is explained succinctly in the relevant paragraph from that post:
These proposals share two qualities that we believe the community finds important: a 20% dev fund and significant funding for the ZF and ECC. However ZIP 1013 differs with regards to accountability and the explicit financial development of external developers. The Foundation feels strongly about accountability and transparency — as stated in our original guidelines in August — as well as third party developer support and growth. Two of the three proposals that received the strongest community support align with that view; it’s clear there’s strong sentiment for both more accountable and decentralized Zcash development.
Therefore the Foundation will build on ZIP 1012, a version of Matt Luongo’s ZIP 1011 with modifications by Eran Tromer, which received the most support on the forum and Community Advisory Panel.
As you yourself admit, it makes sense to build on ZIP 1012 as the proposal that received the most support. And as @tromer mentioned, it’s not clear how these proposals could be combined particularly given the accountability and third-party developer requirements requested from both the Foundation and the broader community…and the main concern you have about underfunding the ECC is arguably better served by them having the possibility for more funds as stated by @tromer:
All of which to say: I promise we didn’t ignore ZIP 1013.
Summarizing your other concerns, with responses below:
There’s bias from me suggesting integration of my (admittedly reasonably supported proposal) with ZIP 1012
You believe the Foundation should have more power in determining/vetoing Major Grants
You want to explore other percentages of distribution for the various slices
My and the Foundation’s bias
Everyone is biased, myself very much included. But I hope that the community recognizes that the initial improvements the Foundation suggested from my ZIP 1010 served to reduce the Foundation’s power, particularly with regards to grant selection. After the community feedback earlier this week, we scaled back our changes considerably and gave the Foundation more power (namely in administering the Community Advisory Panel) but the Foundation still has preference in reducing our ability to countermand major grant decisions.
Granting the Foundation More Power (for Major Grants)
I have mixed feelings about this. As @ChileBob suggested there could be a veto in the case that the Foundation believes it violates community consensus or the Foundation’s mission? Providing a final veto for arbitrary reasons seems dangerous to me, particularly as we’re seeking to broadly distribute funds outside of the Foundation (sentiment which seemed widely supported by our interpretation of the results). And there’s already a veto for some circumstances (violating Foundation’s operating docs and/or US law).
I think a way to gauge this is to add something similar to @dontbeevil’s poll to the final Helios vote which is broader; I think this makes sense given the discussion here.
Other distribution options for various slices
I understand the point you’re making, and perhaps giving people various choices in the final vote for the percentage distribution could offer us greater insight in the community’s support, which I expect would solve the biggest issue you have.
However I do take exception with the bolded suggestion you make regarding percentages: in none of the leading proposals did the Foundation receive less than 25% of the dev fund for its own operations, and you’re suggesting a new percentage that has no precedent or community support. (In the top three proposals, those numbers were 25%, 30%, and 50%)
It just seems strange to suggest that you trust and support the Foundation more than our modified ZIP 1012 suggests, but then anchor anyone reading this thread to reduce the funding the Foundation has for general operations in a way that’s not supported by the community.
So instead, I would suggest offering these options for the final vote, which still minimizes the funding the Foundation receives for its own operations based on the most supported proposal:
ECC
MG
ZF
35%
40%
25%
40%
35%
25%
45%
30%
25%
50%
25%
25%
In essence, this scales the amount the ECC is guaranteed versus what’s available for third parties, from 35% all the way up to the 50% advocated in the “Keep it Simple” proposal.
FWIW, I personally think the more the ECC receives as a guaranteed portion of their slice the less eligible they should be for the MG slice, but as that wasn’t part of any proposal (and that’s quite hard to prescribe) I won’t push for that change. However I hope the future grant review committee/Foundation-appointed body takes that into consideration when distributing those funds if the community agrees to increase the guaranteed amount received by the ECC.
Improvements to the Final Helios Poll
In final summary, I think all of these concerns can be ameliorated within the context of the final Helios poll, which will merge the eligible participants from the forum poll (71 users) and the existing community advisory panel (62 users). For all these users we will attempt to remove duplicates if we can determine identity.
We will ask three questions:
“Do you support the modified ZIP 1012 presented here?”
Yes
No
Abstain
“Using modified ZIP 1012 as a basis, what should the distribution of the dev fund slices be?”
ECC: 35%, MG: 40%, ZF: 25%
ECC: 40%, MG: 35%, ZF: 25%
ECC: 45%, MG: 30%, ZF: 25%
ECC: 50%, MG: 25%, ZF: 25%
“Do you believe the Foundation should have independent authority in determining Major Grants, or should there be a new Major Grant Review Committee as prescribed in modified ZIP 1012 as currently written?”
Yes
No
Abstain
From the results of this poll we can assemble a final modification of ZIP 1012.
Note that the Foundation hasn’t yet collected specific feedback from the ECC on our modified ZIP 1012, so we may make additional changes prior to the poll which may materially change these questions. But I think this structure of polling could provide greater insight into the community’s preferences on some critical pieces of ZIP 1012 without changing the fundamental tenets of (widely-approved) ZIP 1012. Thoughts and feedback welcome.
You are right; the slices you suggested make more sense.
Yes, I never meant to suggest bad intentions, just a bias. I think its noble to try to reduce the foundations power but I’m just concerned about unintended consequences of a new committee.
Thanks for your leadership @acityinohio. Per Zooko’s post, it is my recommendation to wait to finalize the poll until we have a chance to respond early next week.
I will close the sentiment collection poll tonight. As there will be a poll from ZF to collect sentiment anyway. Feel free to vote it anyway, ZF might remove that from poll if all of us vote for single option.
Small suggestion – I know this likely isn’t the final text, but I’d try to avoid a two-choice question with “yes/no” answers. It’s unclear which is which in this case.
Better might be
A “Foundation should have total authority”
B “There should be a new committee with Major Grant authority”
