Community Sentiment Polling Results (NU4) and draft ZIP 1014

Poll results are up. Interesting numbers. Had a chance to look at https://eco.com/about , Check out the governing section (slightly similar).

Since that was mostly an in-house flash Pole ( the low turnout indicates it was probably mostly people involved in this particular conversation) I think revealing who voted for may have been a little more interesting than just 4-4-3 (or 8-7 if “either” can mean both)
Just a thought

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Hi,

It has taken me a bit to catch up on this. Im not sure I fully understand what is going on.

For example, the vote. Shouldn’t it have the original proposal vs the proposal with modifications, rather than the modifications of the proposal? It is starting to feel a bit like design by committee and not in a good way.

If there is going to be an abstain option on questions one and three, shouldn’t there also be one on question 2 also. - the way it is outlined above I can abstain from answering if I like the proposal or not, but am forced to make a decision on the distribution. it doesn’t make too much sense.

On the subject of abstaining, I think this might need to be qualified for this poll, so that if there is a majority of abstain votes then it is for the proposal in its original form. - This I understand will be controversial. but it seems to make sense to me.

So I did some quick back of the envelope calculations on the different % splits and looking at the extra restrictions on the ECC and how MG’s are paid out - it would seem that giving the 700k and then the ECC have to go through the MG process would yield them more financial reward and a greater amount of freedom.

This I think could be a good thing - if and only if the ECC is willing to persue this route. - I don’t like the idea of making people have to “reapply” for their jobs. (in fact I hate it) but it would seem an elegant solution due to the way it is being suggest MG’s would work differently. - and if they don’t want to do it like that I don’t think trying to force them is a good idea.

You could even use that original 700k as the basis for building the network and then give the ECC extra funding based off how well they can integrate other development teams into the space. (via the MG’s - the ECC get one and so does the team being integrated. for example @mhlungo’s team or other grant winners)

To be fair though, it is more the process I am concerned about than the outcome. It seems pretty evident what decision has been made (which is why I personally believe abstain and possibly absent votes should some how count. - this isn’t deciding on the winner it is more finetuning.)

For example the 25,50,25 split would give 1.4m a month to the MG program, where as 50,25, 25 would only give 350k to MG and 350k to the ZFND due to the USD caps put in place. so realistically 25,50,25 is better for everyone - unless im missing something - which I may well be, its been quite busy recently.

I really like the spirit of this thread, but as I stated at the start, I am not too sure what is actually being discussed and asked about. - I would have thought we would have got a bit more feedback from the ECC before we went to the next stage. (I know they are working on it and don’t want to respond before the final proposal.) but hey. it is what it is.

Thats what I mean by flash pole, I think it was just to add a little more context to the arguement

I suppose I’ll go first (even if no one’s even interested), I voted C for the committee, I don’t know if it can be corroborated but I dont care, its true

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@acityinohio The ZF statement says: “The Community Advisory Panel will continue to be administered by the Zcash Foundation, with an eye toward broadening its reach and enhancing its voting/selection mechanisms.”

Does “broadening its reach” mean increasing the number of its members? If so, would that happen before the Panel is asked to make further decisions and what is the criteria for including new members? Given that the Panel would be responsible for determining the membership of a new grants committee (if indeed a separate body is created), these feel like important details worth disclosing prior to the final vote.

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The more I think about it the less I like the idea of a new grants committee.

It seems unnecessary, a potential weakness and does not use the expertise or trust that ZFnd have already built.

Expanding the community adv group is a great idea, makes it more diverse & resilient. Making more use of it (regular polls) keeps everything on track, including MG decisions, as ZFnd are pledged to serve the community.

But… thats just my humble opinion.

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I dont know my good man I have decided to steer clear of discusions regarding governance as I feel that I wouldnt help much and I would only be in a way.

But to me the ECC getting the smallest slice makes no sense. I could be missing something here, maybe I didnt concentrate enough and missed something.

Can the ECC also apply for grants?

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Yep, they could. See the earlier comment from Josh - a bigger slice could make it harder for them to access MG.

Heh as I said I would be wasting my time reading through all of this and I wouldnt be able to help you guys much. I think I will leave this issue in your capable hands and I will focus on other things, I am good, at that can help us out. I just come here and read out of curiosity I read mostly superficially. Trust me its better this way I am far too emotional to make the right decision here.

I still feel that the ECC slice is too small. We rely on these people to keep ZCASH running smoothly. Remember even BTC was attacked by an inflation bug and they had to kill a block.

ZCASH is preserved for 3 years running and let me tell you something. The way that these people meet deadlines is VERY rare in the software industry and even rarer in crypto.

I feel that the danger for ZCASH is more likely to come in a form of a 0 day exploit rather than a 51% attack. It doesnt make sense to me for the miners to attack the chain. It does however make sense for a hacker to exploit a potential bug.

And I know that these 3 years of running smoothly were no accident. Bugs were found fixed in just the way you want them to be. All Im asking is will ZCASH maintain the same level of security (third party audits cost money) that we have all grown accustomed to and all take for granted but which depends heavily on the expertise of the ECC developers?

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hey,

I see where you are coming from with this, but I disagree. I think without the MG process we have not really progressed much further than before - to the point I think it would be a step backwards to use the KISZ method.

Sure it adds complexity but I think it is valuable in and of itself. How the ZFND have proposed to reconcile this seems okay imho. The question as I see it is how to gather the interests of people and present them with an informed choice.

Can someone please explain a bit more how the %'s will work. - these USD caps seem to be causing an issue. @tromer if the split is 25,50,25 isn’t that more than 50,25,25.

For example say 3million was raised for that month in the dev fund. (cherry picked because it fits my example.)

  • 25:50:25 == 0.75m:1.5m:0.75m (equals 3million)
    or
  • 50:25:25 == 1.5m:0.75m:0.75m (equals 3million)

but due to the caps doesn’t this mean thant:

  • 50:25:25 == 0.75m:0.375m:0375m (equals1.5million)
    or
  • 50:25:25 == 0.75m:0.75m:0.75m (2.25million, where the 3million is the figure, but this gives a large overshoot of fund to the ECC, but not to the zfnd or MG.)

So what happens to the extra zec over this time? were does it live and how does the ECC claim it? It is quite a lot, what about MG recipients? how would they go about claiming the extra to make the total 3million distributed? (assuming the 700k is the limiting percentage and others are aligned with that.)

Sorry if im being stupid and missing something. - the caps only really make sense with a 25:50:25 split.

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@mistfpga, you’re correct. Put otherwise:

  • ECC gets 35% and its excess ZEC starts going into its Volatility Reserve when ZEC price surpasses $91 (=700000/(21000000/4/48*0.2*0.35)
  • Zfnd-GU gets 25% and its excess ZEC starts going into its Volatility Reserve when ZEC price surpasses $128 (=700000/(21000000/4/48*0.2*0.25)
  • Zfnd-MG gets 40% and its excess ZEC starts going into its Volatility Reserve when ZEC price surpasses $80 (=700000/(21000000/4/48*0.2*0.40)

So as ZECUSD goes up, Zfnd-MG gets the fastest USD increase, and once it reaches $700k/month, the fastest increase in Volatility Reserve (and thus increase in runway and withdrawal opportunities). ECC gets the second-largest such increase, and Zfnd-GU the least such increase.

(An alternative is to make the Funding Target be proportional to the coin percentages, i.e., have equal ZECUSD threshold for all three slices. This would not substantially affect ECC, but would change the allocation for the Zfnd-GU vs. Zfnd-MG slices at at high coin prices.)

So what happens to the extra zec over this time? were does it live and how does the ECC claim it

ECC and Zfnd maintain their Volatility Reserves in separate accounts they hold, which they’re allowed to withdraw from only under specified conditions. Quoting the ZF-revised proposal:

[…] the excess over the Funding Target will be put into a dedicated Volatility Reserve account by the funds’ recipient.
Funds may be withdrawn from the Volatility Reserve account only by that same party, in months where the aforementioned monthly ZEC value falls short of the Funding Target, and only to the extent needed to cover that shortfall. […]
The Funding Target may be changed only by unanimous agreement of ZF, ECC, and the majority vote of the Community Advisory Panel. (In case of excessive accumulation of reserves, the community can condition an increase of the Funding Target on the redirection of some of the reserves to a different entity, miners or an airdrop).
Dev Fund ZEC that has been received, not placed in the Volatility Reserve, and has not yet been used or disbursed, will be kept by the corresponding party (as ZEC, or sold and invested) for later use under the terms of the corresponding slice.
Irrevocable obligations to the above must be made by the recipients (e.g., using their Operating Agreements or by receiving the slice as Restricted Funds).

what about MG recipients?

Major Grant recipients won’t be directly subject to the Funding Target. The Foundation-managed Volatility Reserve will, in effect, form a large long-term “endowment” pool (h/t @ttmariemia) that cushions the volatility for the various grantees, so grantees can focus on their work instead of hedging short-term price risks.

Similarly, the Major Grants would need to be denominated in USD (as they already are in the updated grant program), to ensure that they can be paid. (If they were specified in USD ZEC, a spike in ZEC price could cause the USD value to exceed the Funding Target.)

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We may be disagreeing about different things :slight_smile:

I think the ZFnd board would do a better job of making Major Grants decisions than a new committee.

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Exactly my thinking as well. I trust the judgement of the ZFnd and a new committee seems risky. I think most of us want major grants and new teams coming in.

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A couple questions here – does this mean the ZF is going to be paying the MG directly rather than the chain? It appears that opens up issues with the ZF as a single point of failure (rather than advocating an MG recipient and having them paid in via block reward, regardless of the continued existence of the ZF).

I’d also expect any payments from the ZF to be subject to other rules to preserve its 501(c)(3) status, which could get hairy.

What’s the rationale here? I don’t think recipients should be afraid of taking on the risk of ZEC income – they’re being hired to build and drive value to the ecosystem, after all.

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Hmm, yes I think this becomes necessary because of the Funding Target. My proposal actually specifies a Direct-grant option but now that you raise this, I think it’s incompatible with the Funding Target.

It appears that opens up issues with the ZF as a single point of failure (rather than advocating an MG recipient and having them paid in via block reward, regardless of the continued existence of the ZF).

The ZF is a potential point of failure either way, because even with a direct (on-chain) grant, the ZF will participate in the decisions to award the grants and in the decisions on the software upgrades that implement an on-chain grant. So in any case, if ZF ceases to exist, it will be up to community, backed by ECC’s rights in the trademark, to figure things out and re-codify them.

I’d also expect any payments from the ZF to be subject to other rules to preserve its 501(c)(3) status, which could get hairy.

I’m not an expert myself, but ZF seems cognizant of its responsibilities and comfortable with this mechanism. Do you see specific issues that are likely to come up?

What’s the rationale here? I don’t think recipients should be afraid of taking on the risk of ZEC income – they’re being hired to build and drive value to the ecosystem, after all.

Two main considerations:

  1. Grantees ought to be afraid of price volatility. What are they supposed to do if ZECUSD drops to a third compared to their actually needs for paying USD salaries? With Major Grants that are limited in duration, and are not backed by a reserve, this is a huge risk. ECC had it bad even with a multi-year horizon and a reserve and shareholders that agreed to be “diluted” so ECC gets more coins. I wouldn’t like to skirt catastrophe, if we can avoid it.
  2. The usual consideration, expressed by many, that “if ZECUSD surges and this ZEC becomes worth much more than your real needs, then we don’t want to encourage waste”. This rationale applies to all the parties.
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One rationale for the extra layer of indirection here is that since the Zfnd is running it’s own development team for now, in principle it’s in competition with external developers.
For example threshold signing is one of the priorities on the Zfnd technical roadmap. If an independent dev team applied for a major grant including this, it’s nice to have the policy that it would be reviewed by a neutral committee

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I was hoping you had a fancy solution here :sweat_smile:

I assumed that direct grants would keep getting paid out until the community forked away from to a new allocation rule. A little less catastrophic than payments stopping mid-grant.

Mostly around non-charitable grants and contractor bidding requirements, but as per usual, “I’m not a lawyer”.

100%, but these grants are time-limited, right? Removing exchange risk changes the alignment with the chain quite a bit, and recipients aren’t in the same situation as the ECC risk-wise.

Indeed, there needs to be some opportunity for upside?

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Yes, although I’d still rather have ZFnd approve/reject MG applications.

ZFnd exists to represent the community and would be in deep trouble if it didn’t, so in practice there wouldn’t be competition. If I understand correctly ZFnd can’t award itself funding from MG either?

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This is good point, shouldn’t a grant recipient at least have an option to receive some or all of the grant denominated in ZEC? Having a share in the upside of ZEC price movements is really important to align incentives. Maybe even a minimum like at least 10% or 20% of a grant is denominated in ZEC, with an option to have a higher percentage?

I think the committee is beneficial in terms of avoiding potential conflicts of interest

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