To clarify, although I vehemently opposed the 2020 extension of the Dev Fund, I take no position on the question of whether the Dev Fund should be extended in 2024 because (via Ycash) I have opted-out of “Zcash Governance” completely.
With that said, I believe I can constructively contribute to this Town Hall because many of the reasons that I opposed the 2020 extension are relevant to the current discussion about 2024.
Since I won’t be able attend due to time difference I have a question for you:
Is Halo a useful innovation? Would Halo still have been developed if the dev fund extension didn’t occur in 2020? Will Ycash in any way adopt Halo in the future?
My own answer to the above:
(1) Yes. (2) Yes, but dev fund accelerated its development and implementation into practical use by a few decades. (3) I take no position on the question regarding Ycash future, I’m just a YEC yodler and have no idea about Ycash development.
will the wrapup of the results of the above polls at some point? Interested in getting a summary as someone who doesn’t have that much time to follow all the discussion on the forum yet still has a deep interest in Zcash and the future of private money.
My primary concern is that the DevFund, as implemented, is subject to significant coercion by US Authorities. I am in favor of structural shifts away from that imploding entity. Now is not the time to double-down on investments in Brand USA, now is the time to recognize sunk costs, and shift investment elsewhere.
Frankly I am surprised this hasn’t been dominating the conversation… did I miss it?
Did anyone do a summary of the discussion number 2 that would help us out who cant listen to the whole episode. if no volunteers guess ill have to try and make it
Agreed. I’m surprised it hasn’t been dominating the conversation as well. It is worth noting that it’s the issue that received the most support in the Dev Fund poll.
This has been a very interesting discussion over the last few months, but how do we condense these ideas where we can decide on a path forward. Changes to the dev fund will require tinkering with proctocol and the halving is 18 months away so we probably need to get a move on
The next step is for community members to synthesize these ideas into concrete proposals, which will likely occur over the next several months. The process that was followed in 2019-2020 (summarized nicely by Dodger here) was “Discussion → Ideas → Concrete Proposals → Voting → Adjustment → Voting → Consensus → Implementation → Activation.”
can a fees structure be out in place alongside the existing structure where there is a transaction fee as a percentage of the transaction value. For example, if I transfer 100, the transaction fee is 50 cents - 1. The transaction fee then gets split
25% directly to the team who built the app that generated the transaction. This will incentivize third party developers to create apps and fund development themselves. The existing dev fund could focus on creating the tools/SDKs all developers need to create apps and not fund any projects directly
25% to zcash holders
25% to dev fund for core SDKs
if zcash moves to POS, 25% would need to go to the hardware for processing.
all % above are placeholders for discussion purposes.
so if a team were to create a stable coin, they would get a % directly from the transaction fee
a transaction fee structure better aligns development with desired results (transactions). more importantly it’s already an accepted standard by people worldwide and it decentralizes development efforts so the dev fund doesn’t need to worry or risk money for creating apps that may or may not work. dev fund can focus on the core platform and create the SDKs all can use equally to create the apps
Split the Dev Fund between 6 parties. Here is an example of 6 parties funded at $39USD after halving:
16% ZCG ($2,455,872 a year)
14% ECC ($2,148,888 a year)
10% ZF ($1,534,920 a year)
10% QEDIT ($1,534,920 a year) (non-US based)
6% SHIELDED LABS ($920,952 a year) (non-US based)
4% HANH ($613,968 a year) (non-US based?)
Enforce a smooth 30% reduction in funding each year. This would mean by the end of 2025 the breakdown at $50.7USD would be:
11.2% ZCG ($2,455,872 for the year)
9.8% ECC ($2,148,888 for the year)
7% ZF ($1,534,920 for the year)
7% QEDIT ($1,534,920 for the year)
4.2% SHIELDED LABS ($920,952 for the year)
2.8% HANH ($613,968 for the year)
The remain portion would be left in the ZSF. This would build up ZSF’s reserves while also freeing up 18% of the Dev Fund to be allocated to existing recipients or new recipients by the end of 2025.
Pros:
If ZEC stays around $40 then ECC can fund itself through 2025.
If ZEC goes above $40 then ECC can consider expanding its operations again.
This moves about 1/3 of our funding to entities based outside the US
Most miners sell all their ZEC quickly to cover costs putting downward pressure on the price of ZEC. Dev fund recipients typically hold ZEC for longer periods delaying the downward pressure in the price of ZEC.
Dev fund committee could better react to changes in market conditions and adjust funding as necessary.
Cons:
We would be accelerating the reduction of mining rewards to the levels of ~3rd halving. Keep in mind Bitcoin will undergo its 4th halving on April 2024.
A dev fund committee might not perform as intended and create a giant overhead mess.
The funding model based on token issuance isn’t sustainable is it? A long term sustainable model is needed. One that incentivizes teams to fund their own development. There is a lot of money out there and if teams are not wanting to build on zcash using their own money the question i have is why not?
I don’t think I agree with this sort of direct funding. In my eyes, it should go through ZCG. Eventually it becomes:
1% to PERSON_1
0.75% to TEAM_B
etc
Otherwise, what’s the point of ZCG?
Also, Shielded Labs, while a nice concept hasn’t really proven itself, so in any case your rough breakdown is kind of off balance esp. considering the amount of work @hanh has already done far outweights any that Shielded Labs (or maybe even Qedit) has done.
I don’t have a stance on the proposal. I just want to comment something technical/ methodological
dev fund direct recipients should have contingency plans and not be individuals since changing a recipient is a slow process it can’t be done on the fly.
I think @hanh is great! It’s not about him. It’s about our human nature.
we humans alone are too fragile to be some recipient hardcoded in a protocol.
So the recipient should be “Hahn labs” that is a recipient that has resilience over the director being unavailable. It’s fair to the zodlers and to the recipient because if they need to step down for any personal reason they wouldn’t be able to and we would be cutting down their freedom as well which is the opposite as the Zcash core values
I like to clarify that individuals or organizations can also request funds through the granting entities whatever their names are. Those funds are easily reassigned in case of contingencies and it does not require changing code and pushing updates (*)
(*) unless the fund recipient chooses to implement a system that does, which would be the recipient’s sole responsibility
Your best point is here below. Decreasing miner control of ZEC is our most important community issue and its tied in with the proof of stake update process.
I don’t think ZCG has much influence on how a team delivers. Look at all the projects that have been funded that never materialized. That’s like asking if I think the bank that gave me my loan improves my ability to deliver after writing my check. ZCG aren’t exactly in an advisory type of role. Maybe Shielded Labs is that?
Listen, if this is ever a thing, I agree with @pacu that there needs to be some sort of contingency plan. What happens if any of the direct recipients dies, quits, etc.
maybe zcash needs to get a personal gauarantee from receivers of funding that they will deliver the agreed upon work. also rights to all code and/or some other form of collateral. the personal guarantee and collateral is released upon the completion of work.