ZF will control general disbursement of funds, but that in no way implies that ZF will have a primary role over MGRC operations - which I would take to include: constructing and evaluating policies (ethical, security, funding, conflict of interest etc.), ongoing grant management and communication with applicants, sourcing new applicants, and day to day scheduling of meetings (both of the committee, prospective applicants, and funded projects).
2.have absolutely no financial interest on any voting proposals
Taken to a logical conclusion, this position would preclude any MGRC members from holding zcash. It’s a very naive policy and one that ignores the standards of practice inherent in modern committee structures. The committee needs a robust conflict of interest policy that will require members to declare all interests (and potential / perceived interests) up front and outlines the expected behavior of committee members when it comes to reporting these interests - see the links I have posted in another thread on MGRC ethics for examples.
On incentives:
have 100% pure intention for the best interest of the Zcash ecosystem
No one ever has 100% pure intentions. People are complex phenomena with many different relationships and interests. That is why it is vital that the committee have strong policies around reporting conflicts of interest, and that committee members are compensated such that their incentives are aligned with the ecosystem.
Full-time or Part-time
As stated above, I think it would be prudent for the committee to vote to establish 2 full time, compensated, co-chairs to carry out most of the day to day work.
It may be that as the MRGC grows that there is a need for the committee to expand the number of full time members or redefine these positions to better scale the work load. Depending on the severity of the change, then that might (as @shawn outlined above) require members to step down and trigger a vote.
On to the point of ECC/ZF representation and the impacts on committee structure:
- Have a fresh unbiased perspective outside of the current (ECC/ZF) ecosystem. This is the reason the community voted to have a new committee, rather than to leave the vote to the ECC or ZF.
ZIP-1014 already lays out a max on number of members from the ECC or ZF. There are pros and cons of using those allotments that the voters will have to decide on.
Both voters and the eventual committee should understand that there is an inherent power dynamic present there, that will affect the committee structure. It would be a bad look for the MRGC and the overall decentralization progress of the zcash ecosystem if the co-chairs (or whatever full time roles are eventually determined) were held by ZF or ECC representatives.
Given the make up of the voting pool and, it would seem that such representation should be expected and designed for: This means that having ECC and ZF representation among the 5 elected committee members reduces the number of those members that could conceivably hold such positions. As such if this 2-3 split is a favored operational structures, then voters should take this into account when deciding who to vote for.