@tromer raised the following issues about this proposal on GitHub PR 276 that were not addressed in the merge:
Locking funds into the future is problematic from a security perspective. If the owner’s wallet is compromised, or a security-related movement of funds becomes desirable (e.g., consider the Sprout bug), then the owner would be unable to move their funds to protect them.
Additional considerations are discussed at Decentralized Participatory Voting through VESTING - #3 by tromer .
So it may make sense to weaken these requirements leaving them up to future community discussion.
and also, in response to the text “Because I share the foundation’s concern that the ECC could be “beholden to its shareholders”, I am mandating that the ECC should be working in the service of the Zcash community and shall serve no other masters. The original investors/founders who are not still working in the service of the Zcash community should not have control over the use of the new dev funds.”:
Under ECC’s current structure, I think the first requirement is impossible to meet as phrased: as a partnership, ECC is inherently “beholden to its shareholders”, and its board is determined by shareholders. Here’s an idea for alternative phrasing (jointly for these two requirements):
ECC must undertake a firm obligation to use the Dev Fund only in support of the Zcash cryptocurrency and its community, and to not distribute the Dev Fund proceeds to its partners (“shareholders”), other than
- In fair compensation for ongoing work
- For covering pass-through tax obligations to partners caused by ECC’s receipt of the Dev Fund
This obligation must be made irrevocable within ECC’s corporate governance (i.e., its Operating Agreement and Board of Directors), and backed by a contractual obligation to the Zcash Foundation.
Addressing this was beyond the scope of my editing role, so I left it as-is for now, but I agree there is a problem.