Inactive/For reference only:: Dev fund proposal: modified 20% combination; 40/60 ECC/choice

Community Collaborations protocol
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Linking the discussion from here [ZIP 1004] Dev fund proposal: Miner Directed Dev Fund (was: 20% to any combination of ECC, Zfnd, Parity, or "burn")

This is a modification of the proposal from @amiller which describes a 20% dev fee is allocated to the recipient(s) of the miners’ choice of EEC, Zfnd, Parity, or “burn” in any combination

This modified version describes the same 20% fee where
-40% of which is allocated to the ECC who in turn opt to pledge half to the ZFND
edit half would be considered a rule of thumb as (in a simple explanation) the amount pledged from the ECC cannot exceed a certain threshold in order for the ZFND to maintain it’s 501c3 status, hence as a requirement this amount is adjustable

It has also been suggested that the transfer of funds should be the result of a multisignature transaction
The timespan for this proposal (as of now) is 4 years to keep in current general timing of upgrades

The remaining 60% is allocated to the miners choice
This option provides guaranteed funding while still giving the miner control over where most of the dev fee goes
(This constitutes an 8% mandatory to->ECC with a 12% to->optional fee and 80% going to miners of the total 100% mined)

Screenshot_2019-06-22-13-57-20~2

The choices to select from will be voted on in the same manner as these proposals to avoid voting manipulation
The timeframe suggested between these “choice” votes is 3 months
Edit- this time frame should be some increment of 6 months as changing these addresses may require a network upgrade and currently they have all held to this schedule, 3 was suggested to maintain a greater sense of community involvement in these discussions
[In my mind the FR field in the protocol is changed to multiple “choice” result fields containing addys selected by the community so any or none could be selected, specification is needed to decide a custom % lest they be equal]

-The ECC is probably the most qualified group of individuals to work on zcash in the world today and the odds of finding another and coercing them into doing what these people want to do are slim by comparison

-although Zcash is exceedingly advanced compared to most projects (which is a direct result of the dev fee) is still very early in development and leaving the possibility of development of the future de facto internet money completely to chance seems foolhardy

-the ZFND and everything it does is entirely dependent on sponsorship, it is not fair to either of them (ECC or ZFND) to string them (or their employees) along in the hopes of receiving a paycheck maybe
Without consistent funding both of these establishments will dilapidate and may have irrevocable consequences on the potential future (the one we’d all like!) of Zcash
:zcash: :zfoundation:

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@chilebob pertaining to your comment on the other thread, I thought about the possibility since the ECC would be pledging half and although I kinda think it should probably stay strictly half, if the other optional amounts donated we’re highly offset then it could be up to a decision about that being adjusted accordingly as needed
But that would be between them and I don’t really know if that might be too overly complicated
OTOH it might be really good, idk
Unless a mandate came for a strict 50/50 split and the ECC honored that then the option described above is essentially baked into this proposal

So to summarize, a rule of thumb for a 50-50 split should hold with an as needed adjustment which could be applied, I think this gives greater flexibility which is always better

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That’s just too much money for protocol development. I don’t think larger community or even Zcash Foundation wants that.

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What ratios do think would be more appropriate? The 20% was extrapolated from the other proposal, I thought it was pretty okay but there’s no reason that we couldn’t discuss it being different

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I think Zfnd & ECC play nicely together so maybe not an issue. If ECC had a funding gap & Zfnd decided to help fill it then they could. The same could apply for Parity, etc, etc.

Thinking more on reward addresses being multisig, makes governance interesting & diverse. Connects well with josh’ post.

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Assuming all parties come to an agreement about any movement of funds (which is probably a safe assumption) then putting it on chain as well makes sense

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40% of which is allocated to the ECC who in turn opt to pledge half to the ZFND

I don’t understand the rationale here. Why propose this rather than 20% to ECC and 20% to ZFND?

-the ZFND and everything it does is entirely dependent on sponsorship, it is not fair to either of them (ECC or ZFND) to string them (or their employees or investors) along in the hopes of receiving a paycheck maybe

I agree r.e. salaries for future development for ZFND/ECC however it is irrefutable in my opinion that investors in ECC have been fairly compensated already via the expiring Founder’s reward and this is a non-factor.

This isn’t that clear but as I understand it’s subdividing 20% of future block rewards i.e. 40/60% of 20%, which given the halvening isn’t such a substantial increase.

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The repurpose is because of the 501 3 C status and that it has to be an opt-in measure (pledge, it cannot be mandatory)
Yes MAINLY for the employees, I may have thrown investors in there for good measure and I will definitely consider changing it :+1:
And yes it is a subdivision of 20%, I’ll try to do a visual aid today

Screenshot_2019-06-22-13-57-20~2

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I think I got block reward % share wrong. Ignore my comment.

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There’s a philosophical reason to prefer this, as it means there’s a clear way to “defund” a non-profit that’s underperforming, which keeps it competitive. The technical 501c3 issues are trickier than that anyway though Understanding the 501(c)(3) Public Support Test - Foundation Group®

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Yeah that’s overly complicated, being able to avoid reverting the ZFNDs status certainly seems beneficial

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Without putting too fine a point on it, Zcash is an incredible experiment but it only goes as far as what we the incumbant are willing to sacrifice for it

I was going to elaborate on this more but there’s really no point, that’s it

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Hi, could you please follow my request on Proposal authors, please read: Help making ZIPs ?

That will help me and ZIP editors know which forum proposals we can help turn into ZIPs.

Thanks again for your contribution!

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Thank you Nathan, as it stands the problem with the proposal is litigation, the system described could jeopardize the 501 c 3 status of the zcash foundation and therefore is not acceptable (we’ve been recently working out the specifications on the “all in one” thread, I only wish we could have sooner)
This system could be implemented (the hurdles are by no means insurmountable) but would very much model the funding system as it exists right now (basically identical, we change nothing) and while I do support moving slowly with governance situations I don’t think that a no op is what the community wants, some kind of growth is better…probably
And as such I will probably end up supporting one of the other similiar-ish models that does not threaten the ZFND
I hope the other authors and advocates consider these subtle nuances when working out their specifcations because it affects every single one that calls for a mandatory development fee allocated to the zcash foundation
A mandatory fee is a tax, a tax is not a charitable donation, nope

Final note, a steady stream of funding from the ECC would constitute a corporate sponsorship which is fine except zcash is not value neutral because both entities endorse it
One could effectively argue Zcash is the product and service of the ECC and since the Zcash foundation endorses “Zcash” any funding from the ECC would be considered taxable advertising and would revoke the status of the foundation

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Hi,

You clearly understand this better than I do. Would you please take a look over my two proposals so far and what you think the legal ramifications are, as you understand them.

It would really help me out.

and

Do you think I need to make adjustments?

cheers mate.

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According to the foundation’s stance they cannot accept any mandatory development fee that also pays out, even partially, to a for profit entity
They have also stated they will not support any proposal that would (enrich Founders or investors)

This implies that the foundation could possibly be the recipient of a mandatory development fee but not the ECC or any other for profit
(That’s why the opt-out measure is appealing because it could perhaps circumvent that but the question is what actually constitutes that choice, there’s a little more clarification now but it’s still kind of Grey area)
But the second option on their order of preferences does not clarify such a thing so the potential of the foundation altering their stance (unlikely) to avoid a contentious hard Fork may exist although the option to perform a hard Fork is very clearly stated along with why they feel strongly against an opt-in measure
(Assuming it were a fixed percentage any Miner who opted out of the development fee would just save the electricity while the rest of them find solutions, presumably the network difficulty would adjust to the loss of the hashrate but whether or not that’s safe I have yet to confirm)

The second thing is that the ECC cannot fund the foundation, corporate sponsorships are legal but because the foundation endorses Zcash, which could be argued to be the product and service of the ECC, it would be considered a taxable advertising donation

Its a complicated situation because ultimately the Foundation’s stance (though I agree with the reasoning behind it) doesnt represent everyone’s so a certain amount of contention is to be expected
There are more “known” unknown variables now

You can postulate hypothetical instances,
-the ECC does not become a nonprofit and the foundation does not change their stance

  • the ECC does not become a nonprofit and the foundation does change their stance

-The ECC does become a non-profit

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And postulate you must

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Yes. This is our request / requirement for any mandatory dev fund, where the opt-out is “don’t run the software / don’t use Zcash,” rather than “run the software and decide not to contribute to a dev fund.”

By contrast, with a “miner’s choice” arrangement, the Zcash Foundation is comfortable with for-profit entities directly receiving protocol-based dev funding.

cc @boxalex as well

I will add this to the megathread and summary as a clarifying statement.

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:face_with_head_bandage: I feel like were circling a little bit, I need to regroup
Remember, miners choice may not necessarily be an opt-in opt-out measure, it can be mandatory and refer to where the fee actually goes
we need to Define some things more concretely

What was described above basically insinuates both, and what you described as basically not running the software for that amount of time as well
If the rewards were fixed percentage (mandatory) of each block then the choice of whether or not to participate in that development fee i.e. opt in opt out, shouldn’t affect the overall amount donated but affect the hashrate of the network, and I don’t know if that’s actually safe, it makes sense the network would adjust but idk
Is the foundation’s idea of Miner’s Choice like this or is it “I can choose to help you if and whenever I want and not if I don’t”? Because nobody is a fan of that! , ) ugh!
It also clearly states that the foundation would not support a mandatory development fee where any recipient is a for-profit entity, need clarification

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@sonya would the Foundation consider the instance described above mandatory or opt in opt out?
@acityinohio also maybe Josh is handy too (haven’t heard much from the old man lately!)
All joking aside, this is that “where the choice lies” thing, at the block reward? Or at finding it?

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