Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund ZIP

I think someone proposed this already somewhere and I can’t find it.

What if instead of forcing ZCG to fund the NSM with 50,000 ZEC, ZCG donated part of that money with the binding mandate that FPF establishes a non-profit mining operation that funded a grant program instead?

Then when the dev fund ends there’s no need to actually have a dev fund because there’s a mining operation that its sole purpose is to donate to a program that funds Zcash adoption and development. In fact, the dev fund could expire the moment that mining pool mines its first mainnet block. period.

edit: I repeat. This idea is not mine. I’ve read it somewhere else and the credit is deserved to those who wrote it and I shall only receive the credit for having very poor retention capacity these days.

Edit 2: I’m posting this as an exercise of lateral thinking. Zcash has historically had a different approach to problems and I firmly believe that it is a value that we must not put aside.

Edit 3: this mining operation could be pooling evenly to all current mining pools. Keeping decentralization as it is right now. Centralization brings regulation risks we don’t want anywhere near. Mining Proceedings could be partly sent to the NSM to secure the protocol in the future as well as adoption and R&D grants.

Edit 4: this idea eliminates the status quo and establishes that there is one way to secure the network: mining blocks. But it retains the resiliency properties that the dev fund proved to provide.

Edit 5: this addenda is compatible with crosslink as well.

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Idea :right_arrow_curving_down:


A proportional split of the 50k ZEC NSM contribution would better match the existing Dev Fund structure.

Current holdings (mid-Nov 2026):

  • ZCG: ~94,350 ZEC + ~$8.75m cash
  • CCF: ~148,950 ZEC

The protocol already allocates the 20% Dev Fund 8%/12% (40%/60%). Applying the same ratio to the 50k ZEC contribution gives:

Fund Contribution Remaining ZEC
ZCG 20,000 ZEC ~74,350
CCF 30,000 ZEC ~118,950

This is roughly a 20–21% reduction for each fund. Under the current proposal the entire 50k comes from ZCG alone, which is a ~53% cut to its ZEC holdings while CCF is untouched.

The streams themselves remain as proposed (8% redirected to the lockbox until Nov 2028; 12% continues to CCF until the same date). Only the one-time treasury contribution is shared in proportion to the protocol’s existing allocation.

This keeps the NSM contribution size the same while avoiding a selective drawdown on the smaller of the two funds. Worth considering as a refinement to the Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund proposal.


And here is a ZIP that does something about it: one test for both treasuries, capped at this proposal’s own 50,000 ZEC for ZCG, and 75,000 ZEC for the CCF.

Read on here:
One ZIP for Both Taps: Fixing the Colossal Treasury Problem