Annually, the Community Advisory Panel could Audit the performance of each elected MGRC member, I hate to put it this way but it would be similar to a push or a pull request on GitHub that would eventually lead to certain representatives being in positions of trust based authority, Trust form the Zcash Community Advisory Panel, who ultimately are random community members and represent the diverse demographic that has been requested.
On github a lot of people are already used to “pay it forward” logic which is what I would be voting for at the end of the day anyway with my ZCAP position.
(think) MGRC will be somewhere between full/part time work. have a feeling proposals will come in waves. 1st elected team will need to put in the extra time to set MGRC up as a properly functioning legal entity, from scratch IRL (this will not be an easy task).
MGRC workload will increase, not decrease over time. have no doubt MGRC membership becomes full time work. only thing we don’t know is when.
MGRC needs to attract top talent over multiple years (maybe forever). figured 1st committee would garner most interest, but there’s only currently 9 people in the running. think that number would be at least doubled if candidates knew the position paid a living wage.
could attract people that just want a guaranteed job for a year that pays well (cash grab). really don’t see this happening. CAP is filled with very bright people. we’ll sniff this out immediately.
proper annual pay is currently very difficult to estimate.
funds paid to MGRC members reduces available funds for proposals.
as-of-now, believe compensation is necessary for MGRC’s longterm success, but a well reasoned argument against compensation could change my mind; not militant about it.
I’m OK with compensation provided MGRC has no control over it, there’s just no clean way for a group to decide how much to pay themselves from a common fund.
Looking at it a differently - the committee will work for and be accountable to others, its that other group who should control reward/compensation. Everyone should have a boss, most actually need one.
Compensation opens other cans of worms, like ‘How much is enough?’, ‘Should everyone get the same ?’, ‘Who works hardest?’, ‘Who put in the hours?’, ‘Performance review? By who?’, blah, blah, blah.
Could quickly devolve into a time-sucking mess & that’s not what we’re here for. I suggest something extremely basic, simple (if at all) & decided during the Helios vote.
Bribes are illegal, while we are on this topic I see 2 problems.
Bribes can be made anon
Z addresses can make that easier to achieve
This type of activity will defame this entire organization and goes against “The Mission” we set out to do here when we adopted Zcash ethics into our lives. Taking bribes could be detrimental to the image of this cryptocurrency.
For instance if Trump started using Z addresses for his campaign manager Jared Kushner, who is his Son-in-Law and attends Bilderberg meetings in Switzerland how do you think the uninformed public would respond to that?
All this considered, I agree that we should approach this in a way that doesn’t encourage bribery, but just simply paying them wont accomplish anything and the bribe is still a bonus on top of every paycheck.
The main issue I see with ZCAP controlling funds or other such decisions is that the ZCAP is an arbitrary group of people decided by the Zcash foundation based on how loud they are on social media (zcash forum, twitter, etc) or based on prior connections to the Zcash foundation. In other words, there isn’t a formal way to become a ZCAP member. There’s a lot of room for bias due to the composition of the ZCAP.
Further, another issue I see is a lot of the suggestions are committees deciding upon other committees upon other committees. This is just going to lead to unnecessary bureaucracy and include subtle ways in which members can be influenced. A way around this would be to use more “DAO”-like tools in conjunction with some needed bureaucracy.
The importance of ZCAP is becoming increasingly clear, and I think it’s great that such a body exists. For the time being, it seems to be the most broadly accepted (and thus legitimate) venue to settle defining issues in Zcash governance. This is valuable and should be built upon. Perhaps the desired relative autonomy of the MGRC can be balanced with a low-overhead role for ZCAP? This can be combined with clarifying and broadening ZCAP membership which is something the ZF has committed to push for anyway.
For some, having all these different bodies may seem like bureaucratic excess. But a more positive framing would view it as a good system of checks and balances in the making. Representative groups with the necessary expertise should be empowered to handle the day-to-day work required to deliver on a shared vision, while the broader community - to the degree it’s possible given existing arrangements and technology - can provide decisive input on the most fundamental questions. As long as there is no practical alternative (coin-weighted, decentralized identity-based, or otherwise), ZCAP Helios votes combined with forum polls and coin holder signalling is what can serve as the latter.
I suppose the specific wording of ZIP-1014 says “or successor process” which suggests we could craft that now, but my understanding based on the Future Community Governance section of 2021 was that such an evolution would be targeted “by end of 2021” which implies a longer timeline. And while it may not be as expansive, the current panel did yield results that were substantially similar to the forum polls for the first round of dev fund polling, which suggests it’s a group that represents community will reasonably well.
Anyway, all of that to say: if we want to expand again for this run, I think that’s a great idea, particularly if it’s in a way that’s easily verifiable/less dependent on Foundation arbitration (e.g. “forum accounts 3 months or older, active Zcash community Discord users, etc”). But I wouldn’t want to do anything more radical than that (since the current iteration of the ZCAP seems to be performing well!) and I’d want to make sure the ECC would be fine with the expansion (since they requested that specific hash in ZIP-1014 originally). And if there isn’t the community/ECC buy-in to do so, I’m comforted that the current panel has performed well in the past IMHO.
I believe folks are over-analyzing the role of the MGRC.
Their job would be to:
Read each proposal.
Assess whether the proposal is positive for the Zcash ecosystem.
Perform due diligence on the proposer’s ability to deliver.
Assess whether the amount being asked is fair for the work to be performed.
Attend a few virtual meetings to discuss the above and vote.
Announce the approvals/disapprovals of each proposal.
I really don’t understand any discussions about forming some kind of entity, having secretaries, paid positions for full-time employees etc.
The funds are being disbursed by the Foundation, so, essentially, the only thing the MGRC needs to do is tell the Foundation where to send those funds.
Please don’t try to make it sound that the MGRC is something else or, even worse, force it to become something else in hopes of financial gain, power grab or other agendas.
The MGRC should be dead simple. Some folks are elected by the ZCAP each year for a 1-year term. They spend some time doing the 6 things I mentioned above (that being part-time or full-time is something we will find out as a community and adjust accordingly). At the end of their 1-year term, the ZCAP elects a new MGRC. Rinse and repeat.
I understand that the money to be disbursed is a lot (and potentially A LOT MORE) but this doesn’t change the simplicity of the MGRC or its goal.
Please keep it real and don’t ruin this wonderful idea and opportunity of having a MGRC.
In this model, the MGRC would not be able to develop and execute a strategic vision. It would have no real power relative to the ECC and the Zcash Foundation, and would depend on the ECC and Zcash Foundation to maintain a multiyear strategy over 4 years with 4 different sets of rotating committee members.
From any point of view, the committee cannot be independent, if only because it does not have the right to a trademark, and as you imagine its independent work, the company and the fund work in one direction and the committee gives out grants that theoretically can be generally incompatible with the network, or should the fund and company keep the committee members up to date? Therefore, I believe that the function of the committee may be at the voting level, and the rest of the work is carried out by the fund and the company by virtue of their competence.
We need complete coordination of actions, and we don’t need to reduce it all to decentralization, the committee does not implement it in any case (trademark)
ZF SHALL strive to define target metrics and key performance indicators, and the Major Grant Review Committee SHOULD utilize these in its funding decisions.
The Zcash Foundation will need to define “key performance indicators” that the MGRC should use.
For grant recipients, these conditions SHOULD be included in their contract with ZF, such that substantial violation, not promptly remedied, will cause forfeiture of their grant funds and their return to ZF.
Once the MGRC chooses who to award Grants to, the Grant Recipients must sign thier contract with the Zcash Foundation, not the MGRC.
So, with some pretty specific terms regarding MGRC in ZIP-1014 already ratified by the community voting process, the question becomes is there room to change them? If so, then who gets to decide which parts of ZIP-1014 the MGRC follows and which parts they get to ignore? Will we have to go through another community polling process with several different versions of ZIP-1014?
In my opinion ZIP-1014 is well defined and thoughtfully laid out and we should strive to make the MGRC as effective as possible within those constraints.
There are some items that need to be figured out by the first MGRC in addition to the 6 above, but that list is what I would expect.
Namely, to ensure grantees comply with the “Ongoing public reporting requirements”
ECC, ZF, and Major Grant recipients (during and leading to their award period) SHALL all accept the obligations in this section.
Ongoing public reporting requirements:
Quarterly reports, detailing future plans, execution on previous plans, and finances (balances, and spending broken down by major categories).
Monthly developer calls, or a brief report, on recent and forthcoming tasks. (Developer calls may be shared.)
Annual detailed review of the organization performance and future plans.
Annual financial report (IRS Form 990, or substantially similar information).
I have participated in the ZCAP since its inception, however it is not what I would imagine should be used as the voice of the community. ZIP1014 has detailed that it should be replaced.
It is highly desirable to develop robust means of decentralized community voting and governance –either by expanding the Community Panel or a successor mechanism– and to integrate them into this process by the end of 2021. ECC and ZF SHOULD place high priority on such development and its deployment, in their activities and grant selection.
I second this. Current ZCAP members should be asked if they are still interested in participating. I think this should be done prior to the MGRC application deadline. I also think more people should be allowed to join(but when, before or after the election?), and if that is decided, I would like to join ZCAP. Thanks for considering me as a potential member @Shawn
This is a well thought out post. The 6 responsibilities you listed for the MGRC align with what I think a lot of people expect the job to sum up to.
Heres my 2 sats.
The job is simple, you’re right. Decide how to spend the funds.
In order to come up with an answer, many hours will need to be spent by each member on each proposal doing due diligence. This requires the members of the MGRC to have enough time to do the research and why I theorize why it will end up being a full time position.
Imagine getting 5 grant proposals per week, which I think is a fair number once things speed up a bit.
This is all speculation from here.
Reading the proposal - 10-20 minutes
Assess whether the proposal is positive for the Zcash ecosystem. - 10-20 minutes
Perform due diligence on the proposer’s ability to deliver. - 1-3 hours, (looking at github/linkedin/previous websites/projects/work experience/ checking references thoroughly) I think its important for someone who is an advanced programmer to be on the MGRC to help with this.
Assess whether the amount being asked is fair for the work to be performed. 30-60 minutes
Attend a few virtual meetings to discuss the above and vote. 1-3 hours
Announce the approval/disapproval of each proposal. 10 minutes
Emphasizing that this is all speculation, that brings us to an estimated time devotion of 2 to 7.8 hours per member per grant application. Multiplied by the number of applications per week and that becomes 10 to 39 hours per week per member.
The job being part time or full time is entirely dependent on how many grants are applied for.
What happens if there are too many part time members on the MGRC and it gets swamped with grant applications?