Draft ZIP: Dev Fund Soft Landing

Dev Fund Soft Landing

This is a minimal successor to ZIP 1016. It keeps the existing governance, voting, multisig, veto, and disbursement rules exactly as they are today, and only reduces the percentages of the two funding streams over time.

Goal
Provide a simple, predictable reduction in protocol-defined funding so the current system can continue to function at lower intake levels, with a clear end date.

Proposed schedule

Period Approx. dates ZCG Coinholder Fund Total Miner
Until 3rd halving Now → ~Nov 2028 8% 12% 20% 80%
3rd → 4th halving ~Nov 2028 → ~Nov 2032 4% 6% 10% 90%
4th → 5th halving ~Nov 2032 → ~Nov 2036 2% 3% 5% 95%
After 5th halving ~Nov 2036 onward 0% 0% 0% 100%

(Heights are the actual third-, fourth-, and fifth-halving heights, including the NU7 spacing adjustment. Dates are estimates only.)

What stays the same

  • ZCG rules and process
  • Coinholder-Controlled Fund mechanics (ZIP 271)
  • Quarterly voting, 420k ZEC threshold, simple majority
  • Multisig, Key-Holder obligations, and veto process
  • Ability to leave funds at rest

What changes
Only the funding-stream percentages step down at the known halving heights. The 2:3 ratio between ZCG and the Coinholder fund is preserved.

Benefits

  • Predictable, automatic reduction with no new governance process or votes required.
  • Existing system (ZCG rules, Coinholder fund, voting, multisig, veto, “leave at rest”) continues unchanged at lower intake.
  • Clear end date after the 5th half removes the open-ended 20% commitment.
  • Aligns the reduction with the natural half cadence the network already uses.
  • Simple consensus change: only the funding-stream percentages in the ZIP 214 table are altered.
  • Gives the ecosystem several years of continued funding while signaling a deliberate wind-down.
  • Preserves the 2:3 ratio between ZCG and the Coinholder fund so both mechanisms scale down together.

Potential pitfalls

  • Absolute ZEC flowing to the fund drops sharply after each half; teams that rely on it may face funding gaps if they do not adjust.
  • No flexibility once the schedule is activated — percentages cannot be raised later without a new consensus change.
  • The hard zero after the 5th half may be too aggressive if ongoing maintenance or security work is still needed.
  • Lower intake does not automatically reduce the cost or complexity of running the existing voting and multisig processes.
  • If ZEC price falls significantly, the reduced percentages could leave both streams under-funded relative to current expectations.
  • Community or coinholder preference may later favor a slower taper, a permanent floor, or a different split — none of which this schedule allows without another ZIP.
  • Implementation risk is low, but any error in the height boundaries or NU7 spacing adjustment would misallocate rewards until fixed by a subsequent upgrade.

These risks can be mitigated by (a) treating the schedule as the default that a future ZIP can still replace, (b) offering an optional permanent floor variant for feedback, and (c) expressing all height boundaries relative to the actual half heights (including the NU7 adjustment). The draft will be updated based on discussion before it moves past Draft status.

I intend to turn this into a formal ZIP draft (draft-dismad-devfund-soft-landing).

Open questions

  1. Are the step sizes (20% → 10% → 5% → 0%) appropriate, or would you prefer a slower or faster taper?
  2. Should the final sunset be at the 5th half, the 6th half, or later?
  3. Do you prefer a hard zero, or a small permanent floor (for example 1% + 1.5%) after the last step?
  4. Should the 2:3 ratio between ZCG and the Coinholder fund stay fixed, or should it be allowed to change?
  5. Is expressing the schedule purely by half heights (including the NU7 adjustment) clear enough, or are there other height or date anchors you want?
  6. Are there any existing processes or rules that would become impractical at the lower intake levels?
  7. Would you rather see an alternative schedule (different percentages or different timing) considered before a draft ZIP is written?

Thanks. :heart_suit: :shield: :zebra:

10 Likes

Absolutely love this proposal. I will also go for a fiat proposal, which I will post today.

3 Likes

For my position last round, which hasn’t yet changed:

I highly encourage folks who truly care about Zcash governance to read the entire thread ( its huge ). Most wont.

1 Like

Thanks for leading me here. This in many ways makes the most sense for at least for now… Keep up the good work.

1 Like

Thank you for proposing this.

The world isn’t using Zcash yet. Our work is not done.

Now that we have significant budgets, it’s the time to deploy. Not to retreat.

We should be aggressively scaling up our marketing spend, while bringing experienced nonprofit leadership into the ZCG organization to manage the larger treasury with mature oversight.

The Zcash ecosystem was desperate for funding for years.

Now that we finally have it, it’s shocking that anyone would want to throw it away.

Scale. Go to market. Set an annual budget and use it.

5 Likes

Withdrawing Soft Landing in favor of the Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund ZIP.

I’m withdrawing my Dev Fund Soft Landing draft. It only tapers the existing 20% streams while leaving governance unchanged, and it does nothing for the Network Sustainability Mechanism, which I have publicly supported.

The Future Dev and Legal Defense Fund ZIP is the better path. It ends the ongoing 8% ZCG stream (routing it into a non-custodial future dev/legal lockbox), requires a 50,000 ZEC donation from the existing treasury into the NSM, and keeps operations intact for current commitments. This is a fairer compromise: it reduces the oversized treasury, directs real value into long-term network sustainability rather than further accumulation, and aligns with the NSM goals I have backed.

My remaining question (raised in the thread) is why the coinholder fund / protocol lockbox does not also contribute to the NSM. That can be resolved with discussion.

3 Likes