HEELARIOUS NON-SEQUITER: I’m not on the ZCAP, so all of my threats to vote this way or that were… so much bluster! Hah.
I mostly agree I think, but I want to continue advocating for a more radical position because I think it’s an important idea to gnaw on.
I think scenario 2. is just fine, and here’s why:
The MGRC member’s success-or-failure to produce results (i.e. Zcash-enhancements) will be used to decide whether they should be re-elected.
If an MGRC member, perhaps flanuering through the park with flowers in their hair, comes up with some concept… and then comes up with a way to implement it, and then asks their friends to help them with their scheme… and then pays their friends with an MGRC grant…
…and the result is a better Zcash…
then I’m okay with it. If their friends are corrupt and/or incompetent and/or unlucky… then the concept fails… then I think the member should be voted out.
I’m okay with that too.
I mean… hopefully MGRC members (e.g. you, hopefully) have deep insight into what Zcash is. Don’t we want the absolute most thoughtful/insightful/creative (where all of these things are the specific Zcash-aspected component of the more general skill) people available, on the committee… DIRECTING THE FUNDING ?
Don’t we want those people to care as deeply as possible about their critical work?
In my mind that kind of person is the kind of person that a project should beg for the attention of.
Should we want to establish a rule that such a person shouldn’t be “too interested”?
I’d like to dig deeper into the underlying assumptions of our positions. I have a feeling that I’m missing folks on a different layer of abstraction. I’d like to understand if there are some sort of axioms that we’re incorrectly assuming the existence of? <-- (dangling participle… oooppps)
So again, I think it makes sense to be careful to consider interests, but I think misalignment of the type you seem concerned about, is adequately controlled for by:
- Public Voting:
The MGRC member makes it obvious where their interests lie, by public voting for funding. I am assuming that if Member A votes for project One, then A is biased in favor of One. Voting is expressing a preference.
The only ways around this I can think of, around this are:
If MGRC Member A’s votes are not public. This is problematic, at least because A can never prove how they voted (for any reason). I think many more specific cases reduce to this.
MGRC member A has some sort of guarantee of disinterest. But it seems to me that a completely disinterested A must vote randomly. Am I missing something here? Is there a way to disinterestedly express a preference? Or is my characterization of “voting” deceptive/incomplete/incoherent?
- Term limits. If Project One fails MGRC member A doesn’t get re-elected.
- Peers: Perhaps the MGRC is structured such that quorum-or-consensus is needed to award a grant… or grants above some size… or some such.
Finally (another non-sequitar)… I confess I haven’t read this whole thread. So I’m going to go do that now, and also apologize for not doing it before.